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PLANNING THE FUNERAL AT THE BIRTH: 
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 
Noah Sachs* 
This Article examines how governments in the world's two largest econo-
mies are diverging in their approaches to regulating hazardous products and 
packaging, with major ramifications for manufacturing, waste management, 
and trade. The European Union is implementing product-oriented environ-
mental regulation based on the principle of Extended Producer Responsibil-
ity ("EPR"), which assigns responsibility to manufacturers to take back their 
products after consumers discard them. In theory, EPR could dramatically alter 
production practices by internalizing externalities from products and provid-
ing incentives for environmentally friendly design. However, practical prob-
lems of implementation raise questions about the effectiveness of EPR as a 
policy tool. 
This Article explores the European experience with EPR, the reasons for 
apparent resistance to EPR in the United States, and the implications of a 
move toward product-oriented environmental law. It critiques EPR on the 
grounds that the transaction costs of EPR may outweigh its environmental 
benefits and that practical problems of implementation may preclude the 
achievement of expected product design incentives. Given the substantial cost 
and technical hurdles to establishing the legal underpinnings of EPR pro-
grams, this Article recommends that the United States consider alternative 
policy instruments to address environmental externalities from products. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the European Union are rapidly diverging in 
their approaches to environmental regulation. In the United States, envi-
ronmental law remains focused on mitigating externalities from produc-
tion-the effluent limits, emissions controls, and technology mandates that 
are the backbone of a command-and-control regulatory system. In the last 
decade, the European Union has supplemented this traditional focus on 
the processes of production with policies to address externalities from prod-
ucts themselves. 
Product externalities are generally less noticeable than the archetypal 
production externality of factory emissions, 1 but aggregated across millions 
• Climenkoffhayer Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank 
William Alford, Ken Mack, Doug Kysar, Jim Salzman, Michael Vandenbergh, and Bette Fish-
bein for helpful comments on a draft of this Article, and Sameer Doshi for invaluable re-
search assistance. Many thanks to the editors of the Harvard Environmental Law Review for 
their assistance and insightful suggestions on revisions. 
1 Most analyses of environmental externalities, including law review articles on the 
subject, use factory emissions as the illustration. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1121 (1972) (discussing a factory that uses cheap coal and pollutes a 
wealthy neighborhood); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I, I 
( 1960) (using the "standard example" of a "factory the smoke from which has harmful effects 
on those occupying neighboring properties."); Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes 
from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (2000) (comparing the efficiency of 
52 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 30 
of items, the environmental impacts of products can be substantiaJ.2 Lawn-
mowers and household paints, for instance, are significant sources of 
smog-causing nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds in the United 
States.3 At the post-consumer stage, products such as computers, batter-
ies, and cell phones can leach heavy metals and other hazardous materials 
into landfills and can release carcinogens upon incineration. The wave of 
product-oriented environmental regulation in the European Union looks be-
yond the walls of the factory and attempts to address the full life-cycle 
impacts of products, from materials extraction to product distribution, con-
sumer use, and disposal. Beyond merely encouraging recycling, product-
oriented regulation attempts to shape how products are designed, marketed, 
used, and disposed of, with the goal of reducing the environmental "foot-
print" of products as they move through industrialized economies. 
A robust product policy was a key element of the EU's Sixth Environ-
mental Action Programme,4 approved in 2002. After several years of prepa-
ration, the European Union issued a new Integrated Product Policy in 
2003, which advocates a suite of policies to address product externalities, 
including product standard-setting, ecolabeling, environmental performance 
indicators, greener public procurement, and information disclosure to facili-
tate life-cycle analysis of product impacts.5 The goal of the Integrated Prod-
uct Policy is ambitious: establishing a "new growth paradigm and a higher 
quality of life through wealth creation and competitiveness on the basis 
of greener products."6 
The European Union and its Member States have already implemented 
product-oriented legislation for a staggering array of products and prod-
uct packaging, from plastic bottles to laptop computers to Fiat and Ford 
automobiles. The legislation is based on the principle of Extended Pro-
using a price or quantity policy tool to regulate factory emissions rather than a direct 
"quality" tool such as abatement technology). 
2 For an article that discusses pollutant emissions from individuals compared to indus-
trial sources, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as 
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004) 
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV]. 
3 In 2003, lawn and garden equipment was responsible for 16% of hydrocarbon emis-
sions and 21% of carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources of pollution nation-
wide. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, REDUCING AIR POLLUTION FROM NONROAD 
ENGINES 3-4 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/f00048.pdf. Paints 
and other architectural coatings accounted for 491 tons, or 2.7% of all national emissions 
of volatile organic compounds in 1998. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, NATIONAL 
AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS 1900-1998 (2000), tbl. A-3, available at http://www. 
epa. gov /ttn/ chi e f/trends/trends9 8/tre nd s 9 8. pdf. 
4 See Dec. No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, Art. 3, 2002 
O.J. (L 242) I, 4. 
5 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Integrated Product Policy-Building on Environmental Life-Cycle Thinking, COM (2003) 
302 final (June 18, 2003). 
6 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Integrated Product Pol-
icy, at 3, COM (2001) 68 final (Feb. 7, 2001). 
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ducer Responsibility ("EPR"), which assigns long-term environmental 
responsibility for products to producers in an attempt to internalize costs 
and convert the linear "cradle-to-grave" production and distribution chain 
into a "cradle-to-cradle" system that encourages recycling, reuse, and im-
proved product design. In practice, EPR has been implemented through 
product take-back legislation, which requires manufacturers to take back 
their products after consumer use or pay a fee to an organization that will 
collect and recycle the products. In 2003, for example, the European Un-
ion enacted sweeping legislation requiring all twenty-five Member States 
to implement take-back by 2006 for a wide variety of electronic equip-
ment, from computers and printers to toys, shavers, and microwaves. 7 
EPR can be viewed as an ecological extension of product liability law, 
making producers responsible for long-term environmental management 
of their products, and its goals are similar in many respects to product liabil-
ity law, such as reducing "injury" and spurring improved product design. 
Just as the concept of tradeable emissions permits leapt from universities 
and think-tanks to legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, EPR theory is now 
being operationalized in directives and national legislation throughout 
the European Union. 
In contrast, EPR has not taken root in the United States, and sporadic 
interest in EPR at the federal level, including a series of EPA-sponsored talks 
on EPR, has not yielded legislation. U.S. environmental law remains over-
whelmingly focused on regulating industrial sources of pollution and 
often neglects the externalities from products themselves. 
EPR has received only sparse attention in legalliterature.8 Commen-
tators on EPR have generally praised it as a promising "next generation" 
environmental policy that relies on market incentives rather than com-
mand-and-control mandates.9 Because the prospect of taking back products 
at their end-of-life may provide market incentives for bringing environ-
mental considerations into the design process, advocates claim that EPR 
might reorient large sectors of industrialized economies toward more sus-
7 Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 
2003 on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L 37) 24 [hereinafter WEEE 
Directive]. 
8 Only a handful of law review articles have addressed EPR to any extent. See Knut F. 
Kroepelien, Extended Producer Responsibility-New Legal Structures for Improved Eco· 
logical Self-Organization in Europe?, 9 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 165 
(2000); Catherine K. Lin et a!., Globalization, Extended Producer Responsibility and the 
Problem of Discarded Computers in China: An Exploratory Proposal for Environmental 
Protection, 14 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 525 (2002); James Salzman, Sustainable Con-
sumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243 (1997) [hereinafter Salzman, Sustainable Con-
sumption]; Megan Short, Note, Taking Back the Trash: Comparing European Extended 
Producer Responsibility to U.S. Environmental Policy and Attitudes, 37 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1217 (2004). 
9 See generally, GARY A. DAVIS ET AL., EXTENDED PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW 
PRINCIPLE FOR PRODUCT-ORIENTED POLLUTION PREVENTION (1997); NEIL GUNNINGHAM 
& DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION (2002). 
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tainable production and consumption. 10 EPR has also been lauded as one 
foundation of a "materials efficiency revolution," through which countries 
can achieve continued GOP growth while radically reducing raw materi-
als and energy inputs. 11 
EPR is one of the most significant developments in global environ-
mental policy in the last decade, and it is time for a critical examination 
of EPR theory and implementation. Are the claims of EPR advocates ac-
curate? Should the United States follow Europe's lead and adopt a com-
prehensive product policy that includes EPR? How has EPR worked in 
practice? What are its costs and benefits? What are the alternatives to 
EPR that the United States should consider? 
In this Article, I critique EPR as a tool for waste management and 
environmental sustainability. My review of the EU legislation suggests 
that the ambitious claims of EPR proponents may be overstated, at least for 
some product classes. EPR should be viewed as one of many ways to 
fund increased recycling, but only in some cases does it succeed in forc-
ing the cost-internalization that would provide incentives for manufactur-
ers to "design for the environment." The transaction costs of implement-
ing EPR on a national or supranational scale, such as sorting particular 
product classes, or even particular brands, out of the general waste stream, 
are substantial and may outweigh the environmental benefits for many prod-
uct classes. 
While EPR seems to be a market-oriented environmental policy, it can 
be difficult to establish the proper incentives and provide a legal founda-
tion for the market to operate. Therefore, implementing producer respon-
sibility for waste can actually be less efficient than other options for ad-
dressing environmental externalities from products. While EPR is often 
touted for its reliance on market mechanisms, EPR legislation in the 
European Union has also involved substantial government mandates re-
garding labeling, reporting, recycling, recovery, materials selection, and 
product design. These government mandates are likely to be more effec-
tive in the long run in reducing hazards from products than the more novel 
product take-back requirement. In sum, implementation of EPR "on the 
10 Gus Speth, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, former CEO of 
the UN Development Programme, and now Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Envi-
ronmental Studies, has argued that EPR is one of the key transitions that needs to occur in 
industrial economies to achieve a more "sustainable world." JAMES G. SPETH, RED SKY AT 
MORNING 152, 167-68 (2004). 
11 See, e.g., John E. Young, The Coming Materials Efficiency Revolution, in BETTE K. 
FISHBEIN ET AL., EXTENDED PRODUCER RELIABILITY: A MATERIALS POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1, 33 (2000) ("Eliminating waste ... potentially offers a huge pot of cash that 
could be devoted to other purposes. The sums involved are quite large in proportion to the 
national budget."); See generally Angela Canas et a!., A New Environmental Kuznets 
Curve? Relationship Between Direct Material Input and Income per Capita: Evidence from 
Industrialized Countries, 46 EcoLOGICAL EcoN. 217 (2003). 
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ground" in Europe appears to be falling short of EPR's theoretical ideals, 
and similar problems would likely arise in the United States. 
To be sure, the lack of regulation of product externalities is a glaring 
gap in U.S. environmental law. Many products have substantial adverse 
environmental impacts, especially upon disposal, that are never taken into 
account in design, production, and consumption decisions. However, to 
address these externalities, policy-makers should examine alternatives to 
EPR, such as fees for recycling paid at the point of purchase, materials 
taxes, and content specifications, which could approximate many of the 
benefits of EPR at a potentially lower cost. At the same time, product-
oriented policies should provide incentives for firms that choose to pur-
sue a closed-loop, reverse supply chain for their own products. Existing 
voluntary product take-back efforts in the United States, organized by 
some manufacturers and retailers, should be expanded and should be 
supported by any future product legislation. 
Part II of this Article explores the problem of product externalities, 
explains the theory of EPR, and critiques some of its underlying claims. 
This Part uses the problem of discarded electronics as a case study in 
product externalities, both because of the overall scale of the problem 
and because discarded electronics have been an active area of interest for 
EPR proponents. Part III reviews the rapid adoption of EPR in the Euro-
pean Union and discusses how new take-back obligations will be unlikely 
to lead to substantial changes in product design. Part IV reviews discus-
sions of EPR in the United States, focusing on discarded electronics, and 
suggests reasons for the divergence of the United States and European 
Union on product policy. Finally, Part V contains recommendations for a 
more comprehensive approach in the United States, including alternatives 
to EPR, to address environmental externalities from products. 
II. THE THEORY OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 
A. The Problem of Product Externalities 
Product extemalities 12 are inherent in industrial economies, which are 
based on a linear production, distribution, and disposal chain that moves 
trillions of dollars of products annually from factories to consumers to 
landfills and incinerators. 13 When viewed from the perspective of material 
12 An externality is a social cost of production or consumption not captured in the 
price system, and the textbook remedy is to internalize these social costs through tradeable 
permits, Pigovian taxes, or other instruments. See generally Sharon Beder, Charging the 
Earth: The Promotion of Price-Based Measures for Pollution Control, 16 EcoLOGICAL 
EcoN. 51 (1996); Donald N. Dewees, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, 21 
EcoN. INQUIRY 53 (1983); Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument 
Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 221 (2000); Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncer-
tainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 218 (1996). 
13 In 2004, for example, U.S. personal consumption of durable and nondurable goods 
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flows, consumers actually "consume" very little. 14 The vast majority of 
products that are manufactured are used only temporarily by consumers, 
in a short time-span on their way toward final disposal. Within this linear 
product chain, 15 manufacturers benefit from a waste regulatory regime that 
externalizes disposal costs and environmental impacts from disposal to 
municipalities and taxpayers. 16 
Think of product externalities as a second price tag on every product 
we consume, representing the real costs of disposing of the product and 
the environmental impacts directly flowing from the existence of that prod-
uct. The price tag may be less than a cent for some products, and several 
dollars for others, but because this price is never actually "paid" by con-
sumers or producers, the price becomes externalized as a social cost. 
One major product externality is the cost of waste disposal. In 2003, 
for example, Americans produced almost 236 million tons of Municipal 
Solid Waste ("MSW"), or about 4.5 pounds of waste per person per day, 
up from 2.7 pounds per person per day in 1960Y Of this waste, 30.6% 
was recycled or composted; 15% was incinerated; and about 55% was 
buried in landfills. 18 In the United States and the European Union, MSW 
disposal is largely funded out of general tax revenues, rather than by per-
unit or per-bag charges. 19 In this zero-price disposal market, neither manu-
totaled almost $3.4 trillion. News Release, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce, Gross Domestic Product and Corporate Profits: Fourth Quarter 2004 (Mar. 30, 
2005), available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/gdp404f.htm. 
14 See WILLIAM McDONOUGH & MICHAEL BRAUNGART, CRADLE TO CRADLE: REMAK-
ING THE WAY WE MAKE THINGS 27 (2002). 
15 Some analysts describe the current production and consumption patterns of products 
as a product "life-cycle." See, e.g., Enrique Tufet-Opi, Life after End of Life: The Replace-
ment of End of Life Product Legislation by an European Integrated Product Policy in the 
EC, 14 J. ENVTL. L. 33, 52 (2002). Others, however, refer to these patterns as a product 
"chain," reflecting the linear movement of products from manufacturer to retailer to con-
sumer to disposal. The OECD uses the product chain terminology. See, e.g., ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSI-
BILITY: A GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR GOVERNMENTS 48 (2001), available at http://www 
l.oecd.org/publications/e-book/970 I 041 e. pdf [hereinafter OECD Manual]. 
16 For a discussion of externalities related to the product chain, see John Rousakis & 
Bernard A. Weintraub, Packaging, Environmentally Protective Municipal Solid Waste Man-
agement, and the Limits to the Economic Premise, 21 EcoLOGY L.Q. 947, 953-63 (1994). 
17 EPA, Basic Facts: Municipal Solid Waste, http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/ 
muncpl/facts.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law 
Review). 
18 !d. These figures are only for municipal waste and do not include industrial wastes 
or construction and demolition debris. 
19 In the past decade, municipalities in OECD countries have implemented "pay as you 
throw" programs in which households are charged on a per-bag basis for trash pickup, or 
for trash drop-off at a municipal disposal facility. These programs can provide incentives 
to minimize disposal. However, they have not achieved widespread acceptance in large 
cities, and their fees are scaled to weight or bulk of trash, which is only a rough approxi-
mation of environmental impacts from disposal. See Terry M. Dinan, Economic Efficiency 
Effects of Alternative Policies for Reducing Waste Disposal, 25 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 
242, 254 (1993); Marie Lynn Miranda & Joseph E. Aldy, Unit Pricing of Residential Mu-
nicipal Solid Waste: Lessons from Nine Case Study Communities, 52 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 79 
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facturers nor consumers have any incentive to reduce waste generation or 
packaging or to consider the costs of disposal in production or consump-
tion decisions. 
A second type of product externality stems from the environmental 
impacts of landfilling and incineration of products, especially products con-
taining hazardous substances. Disposal of products such as paints, elec-
tronics, batteries, cleaning supplies, and household pesticides can lead to 
leaching of toxic constituents in landfills or release of hazardous air pol-
lutants upon incineration. 20 Electronics are responsible for 40% of the 
lead21 and for about 70% of other heavy metals (including mercury) found in 
U.S. landfills.22 Vinyl siding, made of polyvinyl chloride ("PVC"), releases 
chlorine gas and dioxin upon incineration, and about 500 to 600 million 
pounds of PVC are incinerated each year in the United States.23 With few 
exceptions,24 manufacturers have no legal requirement, or any economic 
incentive, to consider the environmental impacts of disposal of their prod-
ucts. 
Environmental regulation in the United States tends to miss these envi-
ronmental externalities from products themselves because they are fo-
cused principally on externalities from manufacturing. Consider, for ex-
ample, regulation of a U.S. facility that uses solvents and pigments to 
manufacture paints. The release of Volatile Organic Compounds ("VOCs") 
in the solvents to the air would be stringently regulated under the Haz-
ardous Air Pollutant provisions of the Clean Air Act,25 and any discharge 
of manufacturing byproducts to water would be controlled under the 
Clean Water Act.26 But the same VOCs, when incorporated into the finished 
paint products and sold to consumers, are entirely unregulated and can later 
be released to the environment when the paint is applied, or when unused 
( 1998). 
20 See generally Rousakis & Weintraub, supra note 16, at 954 (discussing the environ-
mental impacts of landfilling and incineration). 
21 BETTE FISHBEIN, WASTE IN THE WIRELESS WORLD: THE CHALLENGE OF CELL PHONES 
31 (2002) [hereinafter FISHBEIN, WASTE]. 
22 GLOBAL FUTURES FOUNDATION, COMPUTERS, E-WASTE, AND PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP: 
Is CALIFORNIA READY FOR THE CHALLENGE-REPORT FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY REGION IX (2001), available at http://future500.org/documents/e-waste. 
pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUTURES FOUNDATION, COMPUTERS]. 
23 MICHAEL BELLIVEAU AND STEPHEN LESTER, BAD NEWS COMES IN 3s: THE POISON 
PLASTIC, HEALTH HAZARDS, AND THE LOOMING WASTE CRISIS 2 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.besafenet.com/PVCDisposa1Report_2-Column_R6.pdf. 
24 In theory, manufacturers may have an incentive to control the end-of-life impacts of 
their products because of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). CERCLA imposes strict, retro-
active, and joint and several liability on certain parties for releases of hazardous substances. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CERCLA liability can arise for releases not only of industrial wastes, 
but also for any hazardous substances, including those contained in discarded products. 
However, CERCLA does not apply to "federally permitted releases" such as toxic emissions 
from trash incineration. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) and 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(H). 
25 Clean Air Act§ 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). 
26 See Clean Water Act§§ 301 and 311,33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 and 1321 (2000). 
58 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 30 
paint is disposed. In other words, traditional facility-based environmental 
regulation targets only a portion of the overall environmental impacts of 
the product and leaves many of the product externalities unaddressed. 
In the United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"),27 the federal statute that governs hazardous waste generation 
and disposal, contributes to the migration of hazardous substances through 
products and into landfills and incinerators. RCRA exempts hazardous 
wastes disposed by households and many small companies from the full 
range of regulations imposed on larger hazardous waste generators. These 
household and "Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generator" exclu-
sions28 allow trashcan disposal of products containing hazardous materi-
als, such as electronics, computers, paints, and cleansers, facilitating the 
passage of hazardous materials down the product chain from manufac-
turer to retailer to consumer and, ultimately, to landfilling or incineration. 
In contrast, hazardous wastes from manufacturing, such as used solvents, 
lubricants, or acids, are stringently regulated under RCRA Subtitle C and 
are subject to extensive storage, transport, record-keeping, and disposal 
regulations designed to keep such material out of the waste stream. This 
bifurcation in regulation reflects the focus of U.S. environmental law on 
the processes of production, while U.S. law regulates loosely, or not at all, 
environmental hazards from products themselves. Americans generate a to-
tal of 1.6 million tons of household hazardous waste every year, 29 and this 
waste stream is largely exempt from RCRA regulation, regardless of its 
toxicity. 30 Of course, it is not feasible to subject every U.S. household to 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). RCRA contains a host of regulatory requirements 
for hazardous byproducts of industrial processes, from their point of generation to their 
disposal in licensed solid waste or hazardous waste disposal facilities. A waste stream can 
be deemed hazardous under RCRA if it exhibits one or more of the hazardous characteris-
tics of toxicity, ignitability, corrosivity, and reactivity, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-261.24 
(2004), or if it is a "listed" waste within the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpt. D 
(2004). 
28 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(l) (2004) (household exclusion) and 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(f)(3) 
(2004) (conditional exemption for companies generating less than 220 pounds of hazard-
ous waste per month). According to EPA, the household waste exclusion is based on a 
sentence in the Senate Report for RCRA which stated that the new hazardous waste pro-
gram "is not to be used to control the disposal of substances used in households or to ex-
tend control over general municipal wastes based on the presence of such substances." 
S.Rep. No. 94-988, at 16 (1976), quoted in 45 Fed. Reg. 33099 (May 19, 1980). 
29 EPA, HOUSEHOLD HAZARDOUS WASTE: STEPS TO SAFE MANAGEMENT, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hwlhousehldlhhw-broc.pdf [hereinafter EPA, HousEHOLD 
HAZARDOUS WASTE]. 
30 As EPA explained in a 1984 Federal Register Notice, the household waste exclusion 
was a matter of administrative practicality. 49 Fed. Reg. 44,978 (Nov. 13, 1984). According to 
EPA, about 3000 municipalities have established household hazardous waste collection 
programs. See EPA, HOUSEHOLD HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 29. However, these lim-
ited local efforts do not begin to approach the scale of the problem, and state regulation of 
household hazardous waste disposal is spotty. In Massachusetts, local hazardous waste 
collection removes only a small percentage of household hazardous waste from the waste 
stream. See JOHN McNABB, MASSACHUSETTS COALITION TO REDUCE WASTE, EXTENDED 
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY: PUTTING RESPONSIBILITY WHERE IT BELONGS 5 (1999), avail-
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RCRA hazardous waste regulations given the attendant administrative 
and enforcement challenges. But with mounting hazards from products, a 
more comprehensive approach is needed in the middle ground between 
no regulation and full-scale regulation under RCRA. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, discarded electronics became the flash-
point for concern over the environmental impacts of products in the Euro-
pean Union and in the United States. Because many of the EPR laws in 
Europe, and EPR discussions in the United States, target discarded elec-
tronics, the problem of discarded electronics is discussed in some detail 
in this Article as a case study in product externalities. 
Environmental externalities from discarded electronics flow from their 
bulk, quantity, and toxicity. The rapid obsolescence of consumer elec-
tronics raises an environmental corollary to Moore's law3I-today's state-
of-the-art desktop computer becomes, within two or three years, a nearly 
worthless box full of lead, chromium, cadmium, copper, and plastics, des-
tined for a landfill or incineration. 32 Lead is the most common solder ma-
terial in electronics,33 and the Cathode Ray Tubes ("CRTs") in televisions 
and computer monitors contain between four and eight pounds of lead as 
a radiation shield.34 About twenty-two percent of the yearly world consump-
tion of mercury is for electronic equipment. 35 Other toxic components of 
common consumer electronics include cadmium, hexavalent chromium, 
brominated flame retardants, and beryllium.36 Other than pesticides and 
paints, electronics are likely the most hazardous products discarded by 
households in the industrialized world. 
The problem of discarded electronics is especially acute in the Euro-
pean Union, given limited landfill capacity and a high population density 
(almost four times higher than the United States)Y In 1998, six million 
tons of electronics waste were generated in the European Union, and the 
able at http://www.lexingtonma.org/swat/epr.pdf. 
31 In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, predicted that data density on integrated 
circuits (and computer processing speed) will double every year or so. The prediction has 
been accurate and has been one of the driving forces behind the information technology 
revolution. See Moore's Law at 40: Happy Birthday, EcoNOMIST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 65. 
32 COMPUTER TAKEBACK CAMPAIGN, POISON PCs AND TOXIC TVs 9 (2004), available 
at http://www.svtc.org/cleancc/pubs/ppcttv2004.pdf [hereinafter CoMPUTER TAKEBACK CAM-
PAIGN, POISON PCs]. 
33 PER HEDEMALM ET AL., NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, WASTE FROM ELECTRICAL 
AND ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS: A SURVEY OF THE CONTENTS OF MATERIALS AND HAZARD-
OUS SUBSTANCES IN ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS 25 (1995). 
34 COMPUTER TAKEBACK CAMPAIGN, POISON PCs, supra note 32. 
35 BASEL ACTION NETWORK & SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, EXPORTING HARM: 
THE HIGH-TECH TRASHING OF ASIA 9 (2002), available at http://www.ban.org/E-waste/ 
technotrashfinalcomp.pdf [hereinafter EXPORTING HARM]. 
36 See FISHBEIN, WASTE, supra note 21, at 36-37, 63; EXPORTING HARM, supra note 
35, at 9. 
37 The population density of the twenty-five Member States of the European Union is 
about 115 people per km', compared to about 31 people per km' in the United States. See 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 575-76, 614 (2005) (numbers 
derived by dividing population statistics by land area statistics). 
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European Commission projects that this amount will double by 2010.38 
The growth rate of discarded electronics in the European Union remains 
about three times higher than the overall growth rate of the MSW stream.39 
The United States also faces a growing toxic burden from electron-
ics. In 2004, about 47 million personal computers and about 25 million tele-
visions were sold in the United States,40 and, by 2006, over 160,000 com-
puters and televisions, weighing approximately 3500 tons, will become ob-
solete each day. 41 The average U.S. consumer now retires cell phones every 
one and a half to two years42 and computers every two to three years.43 The 
free cell phone, discarded after a year or two, has become the prime em-
blem of a throwaway society in the digital age. 
In the next decade, a wave of discarded electronics will hit munici-
palities as consumers finally start emptying their closets, attics, and ga-
rages of long-obsolete equipment. The pollutants contained in discarded 
electronics rival, in many cases, emissions from traditional pollutant sources 
such as factories and power plants. For example, the 500 million computers 
estimated by the National Safety Council to be discarded in the United 
States between 1997 and 2007 likely contain over 632,000 pounds of mer-
cury.44 In comparison, all the power plants in the United States emit about 
96,000 pounds of mercury per year, according to EPA.45 
As the European Commission has noted, even modern landfills are 
not completely watertight, and "a certain leaching of metals and chemical 
substances cannot be excluded. It goes without saying that environmental 
impacts are considerably higher when [electronics are] put on uncontrolled 
landfills, which still takes place to a significant extent in certain Member 
States and in most candidate countries for accession to the European Un-
ion."46 
38 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment, at 4 (COM 2000) 347 final (June 13, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Explanatory Memorandum], available at http:l/europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2000/ 
en_500PC034 7 _ 02. pdf. 
39 /d. 
40 COMPUTER TAKEBACK CAMPAIGN, POISON PCs, supra note 32, at 9. 
41 /d. at 2. 
42 See Fishbein, WASTE, supra note 21, at 21. 
43 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ELECTRONIC PRODUCT RECOVERY AND RECYCLING 
BASELINE REPORT 14 (1999). Many discarded electronics are not really obsolete. Cell 
phones and computers manufactured four years ago, for instance, can still perform the vast 
majority of functions that most consumers actually use. Consumers upgrade for the latest 
features, not because their existing products have become, in some sense, unusable. While 
computers as a whole are designed for a five-year useful life, many of the subsystems 
(drives, memory, keyboards) are designed to last even longer. See H. ScoTT MATTHEWS ET 
AL., DISPOSITION AND END-OF-LIFE OPTIONS FOR PERSONAL COMPUTERS 8 (Green Design 
Initiative Technical Report #97 -10 1997). 
44 EXPORTING HARM, supra note 35, at 6. 
45 See .EPA, Emissions of Mercury by State ( 1999), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/combust/ 
utiltox/stxstate2.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (on file with the Harvard Environmental 
Law Review). 
46 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 38, at 9 (footnote omitted). 
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Electronics disposal is propelled primarily by market forces, as con-
sumers upgrade to new products, but law also plays a significant role, at 
least in the United States. For example, disposal of analog television CRTs 
is about to increase dramatically due to the FCC-mandated change to 
digital broadcastingY 
The public is largely ignorant of the fate or environmental impacts 
of the electronics waste stream. As a report prepared for EPA concluded, 
"[t]he awareness among most computer and electronics buyers as to the 
scope of the e-waste problem is low to none. Even most sophisticated tech-
nology users do not understand the nature of the waste problem, or the 
fact that many of the materials used in computer/CRT manufacturing are 
considered hazardous."48 As for municipalities, "they have been saddled 
with the responsibility for a problem that is not of their own making and 
about which they can do little on their own to prevent."49 
Many U.S. states, overwhelmed by the flood of discarded electronics, 
have focused on changes in waste management practices, but have not 
imposed any particular responsibility on electronics manufacturers to 
manage the waste stream. Several states have implemented landfill bans 
for CRTs50 and rechargeable batteries,51 and some have reclassified elec-
tronics waste as so-called "universal waste" to streamline disposal and recy-
cling. 52 In 2003, California enacted a first-in-the-nation Advance Recov-
47 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(l4)(A) (2000). Under an FCC Order issued in 2001, broadcast-
ers can cease parallel analog and digital broadcasts at the end of 2006 in any market in 
which 85% of television households are able to receive the digital TV signal. See FCC Order 
01-330 (2001), available at www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/200 1/fccO 1330.pdf. 
At that point, owners of analog televisions will be forced either to upgrade to digital TV 
and discard their obsolete analog TV (the most likely outcome), or purchase a set-top box 
that can convert the digital signal to analog. 
48 GLOBAL FUTURES FOUNDATION, COMPUTERS, supra note 22. 
49 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-2. 
50 In April 2000, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection banned 
the disposal ofCRTs at municipal landfills, see 310 MASS. CoDE REGS. 19.017 (2005), the 
first such ban to apply to individuals as well as businesses. In April 200 I, the California 
Department of Toxic Substances Control declared that CRTs are hazardous waste and can-
not be disposed in landfills. See Letter from Peggy Harris, Chief, State Regulatory Programs 
Division, Hazardous Waste Management Program, Cal. EPA, to Sheila D. Davis, Materials 
for the Future Foundation (April 3, 2001) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law 
Review) ("[W]hen discarded, CRTs are identified as a hazardous waste under both federal 
and State law ... "). Maine and Minnesota adopted landfill bans for CRTs in 2003, see 38 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1610 (2004) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.9565 (West 
2003), which was amended by 2005 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 1st Sp. Sess. Ch. I (SF 96) 
(West), which delays implementation of the ban until 2006. In February 2001, Rhode Is-
land became the first state to establish a permanent statewide recycling collection facility 
for computers. See EPA, Electronics: State and Local Initiatives, http://permanent.access.gpo. 
gov/websites/epagov/www.epa:gov/epa.oswer/non-hw/reduce/epr/products/estate.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2006) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
51 For a summary of state battery disposal regulations enacted in the 1990s, see EPA, 
Batteries: Legislation, http://www.epa.gov/epr/products/bat-legislation.htm (last visited Oct. 
19, 2005) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
52 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CoDE § 7:26A-7.4 (2005) (New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection regulations on universal wastes). 
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ery Fee ("ARF") on sales of electronics that contain video displays larger 
than four inches. The ARF is a "visible" fee of between six and ten dol-
lars that will appear separately on price tags and receipts, and the pro-
ceeds will be used to fund free electronic waste collection and an im-
proved electronics recycling infrastructure in California.53 The California 
ARF is a sensible component of a legal response to problem of electron-
ics disposal, and it could be expanded nationally as the problem grows in 
the United States. ARFs are discussed in more detail in Part V. 
In comparison to the United States, the European Union has taken a 
far more aggressive approach to discarded electronics and to other prod-
ucts that pose substantial environmental impacts. Under the principle of 
Extended Producer Responsibility, the European Union has looked to manu-
facturers to fund, and in some cases directly undertake, waste manage-
ment responsibilities. As discussed below, the implementation of EPR is 
plagued by high transaction costs, and these costs are creating an increas-
ing gap between the predictions of the economic theory behind EPR and 
the actual results of EPR programs in Europe. 
B. EPR Theory-Internalizing Product Externalities 
The theory behind EPR, and take-back laws in particular, is that manu-
facturers should be forced to internalize disposal costs and environmental 
externalities associated with their products. As the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") put it, EPR involves 
"(1) the shifting of responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully 
or partially) upstream toward the producer and away from municipalities, 
(2) to provide incentives to producers to incorporate environmental con-
siderations in the design of their products."54 In other words, EPR extends 
the Polluter Pays Principle55-which is most often discussed in the con-
text of factory emissions, effluents, and hazardous waste clean-ups-to 
products themselves. 
EPR can impose four distinct types of legal responsibility on pro-
ducers for their products.56 Economic responsibility, which involves requir-
53 See Electronics Waste Recycling Act of 2003, codified at CAL. Pus. REs. CoDE 
§§ 42460-42486 (West 2004). 
54 OECD Manual, supra note 15, at 9. 
55 The Polluter Pays Principle is enshrined in the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, art. 174, 'li 2, 2002 O.J. (C 325) I 08 [hereinafter Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community] and in numerous international environmental agreements. As phrased in 
Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, the principle means that governments should 
"promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments," 
by mandating that "the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution." The U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Annex I, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, Prine. 16, U.N. Doc NCONF.I51126 (Aug. 12, 1992) 
[hereinafter, Rio Declaration]. 
56 See Michael W. Toffel, End-of-life Product Recovery: Drivers, Prior Research, and 
Future Directions 4 (Oct. 17-18, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at Conference on Euro-
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ing manufacturers to pay all or a portion of end-of-life management 
costs, is by far the most common type of EPR programY Physical responsi-
bility requires manufacturers to take physical possession of their prod-
ucts after consumer discard, dramatically increasing logistical challenges 
through a reverse supply chain and embedding economic responsibility. 58 
Information responsibility involves mandates for product labeling, such 
as component or material lists, to reduce the cost of third-party involve-
ment in post-consumer recycling.59 Finally, liability rules impose financial 
liability for environmental damage and clean-up costs from disposal of 
hazardous products.60 
EPR theory predicts dramatic impacts on industrial economies and 
the environment through changing the default rule for how waste is man-
aged. The linear product chain is a creature of law. Law determines which 
externalities within the chain will be internalized, and which will remain 
social costs. In most jurisdictions, law provides the default rule that mu-
nicipal governments will collect, manage, and dispose of products within 
the municipal waste stream at no direct cost to manufacturers. Under a Hoh-
feldian analysis, a duty on municipalities to manage wastes correlates with a 
right of manufactures to design and produce their products without regard to 
end-of-life environmental impacts.61 Reversing the underlying rights and 
duties in the linear product chain could arguably shift manufacturer incen-
tives and bring environmental considerations to the forefront of manufactur-
ers' business decisions. As Jim Salzman, a Duke University law professor, 
has written, "there is no obvious reason why government rather than in-
dustry should manage waste disposal. The ultimate decision would re-
quire empirical analysis of the infrastructure and transaction costs but, at 
a theoretical level, getting government out of the waste business could be 
beneficial."62 
C. Downstream and Upstream Impacts of EPR 
One obvious impact of EPR is that it will reduce environmental im-
pacts "downstream" from the consumer by avoiding landfilling and incinera-
tion. A manufacturer take-back requirement would be expected to reduce 
the volume of waste headed for disposal in landfills and incinerators and 
pean Electronics Take-Back Legislation: Impacts on Business Strategy and Global Trade, 
Fontainebleau, Oct. 17-18, 2002, available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/toffel/ pa-
pers/EOL_ Takeback_LitReview.pdf) (listing economic, physical, information, and liability 
responsibilities). 
57 /d. 
58Jd. 
59Jd. 
6() /d. 
61 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTION AS APPLIED 
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 12-14 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., Ashgate 2001). 
62 Salzman, Sustainable Consumption, supra note 8, at 1279. 
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would also divert toxic constituents from the waste stream, such as the 
lead, chromium, and mercury found in consumer electronics. I call these 
"downstream impacts" of EPR. 
A closed loop system of take-back, recycling, and reuse should also 
reduce pressure on firms to find and exploit virgin raw materials. For ex-
ample, recovering scrap metal from a discarded computer or microwave 
could reduce the demand for processing newly mined bauxite into alumi-
num, or newly mined iron ore into steel. The intense energy inputs in min-
ing, processing, and finishing virgin metals could also be avoided under a 
closed-loop take-back regime.63 I call this avoided virgin material and 
energy use "resource benefits" of EPR. 
Finally, according to EPR advocates, if manufacturers know they will 
bear the burden of difficult to recycle or toxic products at the end of a prod-
uct's life, they will have an incentive to redesign products, to the extent fea-
sible, to avoid adverse environmental impacts. Producers might design 
products for longer life-spans, enabling reuse, or they might design for recy-
clability and easier disassembly to facilitate the reverse supply chain that 
would be spurred by EPR. In theory, EPR would make environmental 
considerations a core element of businesses' bottom line, introducing com-
petitive pressures to minimize end-of-life waste management costs through 
better design, just as firms seek to reduce other costs of doing business. I 
will refer to these incentives as "design impacts" of EPR. 
Bette Fishbein, an EPR analyst at INFORM, Inc., an environmental 
research group in New York, has described EPR's resource benefits and de-
sign impacts, both of which occur "upstream" from the consumer, as fol-
lows: 
A producer that responds to EPR by making a less wasteful and 
more recyclable product will reduce the huge environmental im-
pacts of raw materials extraction ... , as well as the impacts of 
materials and energy use associated with materials processing 
and the manufacture of new products .... By extending pro-
ducer responsibility to the post-consumer stage, EPR forges a 
critical link between the end of life of products and product de-
sign. It puts end-of-life management on the radar screen of product 
designers, which is essential to developing sustainable prod-
ucts.64 
63 Resource benefits are achieved even if EPR is applied to so-called "historic waste," 
or products already on the market when take-back legislation is enacted. Requiring manu-
facturers to take back and recycle historic waste could avoid some near-term raw material 
extraction for new products. However, there can be no design incentives for such historic 
wastes. 
64 BETTE FISHBEIN ET AL., EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY: A MATERIALS POLICY 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 62 (2000) [hereinafter FISHBEIN ET AL., EXTENDED PRODUCER RE-
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These two potential upstream impacts of EPR are at the root of claims 
that EPR can reorient industries toward sustainability by using the take-
back obligation as a policy "hook" to change design and production prac-
tices. The theory depends on price signals and feedback from the end of 
the product chain to the beginning. It also depends on each firm bearing 
the waste management costs of its design and production decisions. As dis-
cussed below, such individualized cost internalization is difficult to ad-
vance in practice and is plagued by substantial transaction costs, under-
mining the ambitious potential of EPR. 
D. Who Is the Polluter? 
A key question that needs to be answered in assessing the costs and 
benefits of EPR is whether it makes sense to involve producers in waste 
management at all. Industry groups have frequently argued that EPR dis-
torts the Polluter Pays Principle because it is consumers, not producers, 
that are the "polluters" in the context of product externalities.65 Consum-
ers actually introduce products into the environment by discarding them, 
whereas producers are making a useful product, not a waste. In this view, 
product externalities such as waste disposal costs or environmental impacts 
of disposal are caused by the consumer's decision to consume, not the 
producer's decision to produce. 
Coasians might argue that the initial assignment of obligations for 
waste management is immaterial because obligations can be shifted, through 
bargaining among the parties, to the most economically efficient state. How-
ever, the initial assignment of liability does make a difference in the con-
text of waste disposal, given the high transaction costs of bargaining among 
various actors, including product manufactures, retailers, municipalities, 
individual consumers, and people harmed by environmental externalities.66 
SPONSIBILITY). 
65 See, e.g., EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR PACKAGING AND ENVIRONMENT, PRODUCER 
RESPONSIBILITY DEFINED: A BRIEFING PAPER (1998) available at http://www.europen. 
be/issues/prodrep.html (noting that "it is to the producer of the environmental impact that 
responsibility must be assigned, and not to the producer of the product."). See also Tufet-
Opi, supra note 15, at 43-44; Bette K. Fishbein, EPR: What Does It Mean? Where Is It 
Headed?, POLLUTION PREVENTION REV., Autumn 1998, at 45 [hereinafter Fishbein, EPR: 
What Does It Mean?] (noting the opposition of European industry groups to EPR for pack-
aging). 
66 While consumer mandates would likely have only a weak effect on production prac-
tices, it is possible that new responsibilities on retailers could influence manufacturer prac-
tices. See James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service 
Economy, 47 UCLA L. REv. 411, 479-80 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Salzman, Beyond the 
Smokest'ack]. The German Packaging Ordinance, discussed infra in Parts III.A-B.l, is one 
of the few EPR programs to target retailers rather than manufacturers. After enactment of 
that Ordinance, retailers pressured manufactures to establish a nationwide packaging take back 
system. When liability is imposed on a retailer, the retailer may be in a position of Best 
Briber-the party best placed to pass responsibility within the product chain until it reaches 
the cheapest cost avoider. Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack, supra at 479-80. 
66 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 30 
If the consumer is viewed as the polluter, a different range of policy 
options becomes more attractive for internalizing externalities, such as con-
sumer-oriented taxes on disposal of certain products, or "pay as you throw" 
per-bag disposal charges for household waste. Such consumer-oriented 
fees could still have desired "upstream" impacts if manufacturers respond to 
the new consumer mandates by producing products that will incur lower 
fees for consumers upon disposal. 
Yet there are several strong arguments for assigning liability to pro-
ducers, at least in theory. Principles of industrial ecology67 provide the basis 
for one such argument. One of the core principles of industrial ecology is 
that the ecological web provides essential "natural capital" for industrial 
production, such as raw materials (chemicals, coal, cotton, etc.); materi-
als for construction of manufacturing facilities (steel, concrete, lumber, 
etc.); "assimilative capacity," such as airsheds and watersheds for depos-
iting waste; and biological services (air, water, food) to sustain employ-
ees. 68 The implication of industrial ecology is that the interface between 
industry and the environment is not just at the point where the smoke 
leaves the smokestack, but rather, environmental externalities have their 
origin in the design decisions for the products produced in the factory, 
and indeed, in the decision to produce a certain product in the first place. 
Under this perspective, it makes no sense to argue that a consumer "in-
troduces" a product into the environment upon disposal, because the full 
life-cycle impacts of products, from virgin materials extraction to energy 
use to disposal impacts, are all determined by the design decisions of pro-
ducers. 
On a more practical level, direct Pigovian taxes on consumers for waste 
disposal, or per-bag disposal charges, are either infeasible or have been 
shown to have little impact on the waste stream.69 Some economists have 
concluded that such direct fees on consumers create incentives for moon-
67 Industrial ecology is "the study of the flows of materials and energy in industrial and 
consumer activities, of the effects of these flows on the environment, and of the influences 
of economic, political, regulatory, and social factors on the flow, use, and transformation of 
resources." Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology: Overcoming 
Policy Fragmentation, in THINKING EcOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY 19, 27 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (internal 
citation omitted). 
68 See id. See also Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services 
and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997); Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the 
Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's Ecological Footprints, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197 
(1997-98); INVESTING IN NATURAL CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO 
SUSTAINABILITY (A. Jansson et al. eds., 1994); NATURE'S NUMBERS: EXPANDING THE NA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC AcCOUNTS To INCLUDE THE ENVIRONMENT (William D. Nordhaus & 
Edward C. Kokkelenberg eds., 1999). 
69 See, e.g., Karen Palmer & Margaret Walls, Extended Producer Responsibility: An 
Economic Assessment of Alternative Policies 2 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 
99-12, 1999). See also Don Fullerton & Wenbo Wu, Policies for Green Design, 36 J. ENVTL. 
EcoN. & MGMT. 131, 145 (1998) (noting that a single fee per bag cannot capture all the 
externalities from discarded products). 
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light dumping and that consumers are often poorly informed and do not 
adjust their consumption demand or disposal practices in response to waste 
taxes.70 Moreover, per-bag disposal fees are a blunt policy instrument be-
cause they address only waste volume, not the environmental characteristics 
of discarded products or their degree of recyclability. 71 
The question of "who is the polluter?" should be answered under 
traditional liability principles by assigning liability to the entity in the prod-
uct chain that is the cheapest cost avoider.72 At first glance, the producer 
would seem to be the cheapest avoider of social costs from products be-
cause producers' design decisions related to materials selection, toxic con-
stituents, and degree of recyclability are the major determinants of the envi-
ronmental externalities from products.73 Producers are in a position to con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis of whether design changes are warranted given 
the prospect of taking back a product at the end of its useful life, and they 
have the best information about potential re-use possibilities for their 
scrapped products. Whether increased costs for producers can be passed 
along to consumers will depend on producers' market power and con-
sumer demand elasticities. Municipalities, which bear most of the responsi-
bility for waste management at present, have no influence over the envi-
ronmental profile of the products that they manage in the waste stream. 
The cheapest cost avoider cannot be determined in the abstract, how-
ever. The result depends on the product in question, the externalities that 
flow from the product, and the transaction costs of managing the product 
under different assignments of responsibility. For low-value products with 
small environmental impacts (such as toys, clothing, or furniture), overall 
social costs may be minimized, as a practical matter, through assignment of 
responsibility to municipalities. The transaction costs of EPR, including 
separate collection, tracking and management of waste, and assessment of 
fees on producers, will likely outweigh the environmental benefits of EPR 
for such products. For these kinds of products, enacting regulations to 
assign responsibility to producers, then undertaking the logistical chal-
lenge of carrying them out, is probably not worth the effort. 
The merits of EPR need to be assessed for diverse product types and 
national circumstances. The full range of transaction costs under conditions 
of producer responsibility must be examined and should be compared 
against the costs and benefits of municipal responsibility or retailer or con-
sumer responsibility. Even if there are strong theoretical arguments for 
assigning responsibility to producers, problems of implementation may lead 
policy-makers toward second-best alternatives. The costs and benefits of 
EPR also need to be compared against alternative policy instruments that 
70 See Marco Runkel, Product Durability and Extended Producer Responsibility in 
Solid Waste Management, 24 ENV'T & RESOURCE EcoN. 161, 161 (2003). 
71 Palmer & Walls, supra note 69, at 8. 
72 See Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 1, at 1096-97. 
73 See Salzman, Sustainable Consumption, supra note 8, at 1279. 
68 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 30 
could approximate the upstream and downstream benefits of EPR at 
lower transaction costs. Such instruments, such as Advance Recovery Fees, 
content standards, and recycling subsidies, are discussed in more detail in 
Part V. 
The goal of this Article is not to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis of EPR for every possible product type. Rather, the Article illus-
trates the problem of transaction costs and lack of design incentives in 
EPR programs in the European Union, and it suggests that many of the 
ambitious claims of EPR proponents are overstated. 
III. EPR IN EUROPE: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. European EPR Legislation 
The European experience with EPR suggests, on the one hand, that 
EPR programs can be implemented at national and supranational scales. 
The European Union and individual European nations have supplemented 
traditional, facility-based environmental regulation with product-oriented 
legislation targeting products that were difficult to manage with the EU's 
limited landfill and incineration capacity. EPR legislation has been adopted, 
or is about to be adopted, in all twenty-five EU Member States, and for 
the most part, the objectives of European EPR programs to reduce landfill 
impacts and stimulate a closed-loop recycling system are being met. 
On the other hand, European EPR programs have involved large lo-
gistical hurdles and transaction costs and, for many types of products, the 
legislation is not providing the expected ecological design incentives that 
are at the core of EPR theory. Indeed, the European Union has frequently 
coupled its product take-back programs with direct design mandates, such as 
materials standards or bans on certain chemicals in products, and it ap-
pears that these command-and-control mandates may be more important 
in the long run in improving the environmental profile of products than 
the "next generation" product take-back legislation. 
Germany's 1991 Packaging Ordinance-the first practical application of 
EPR in Europe-serves as the leading example of how product take-back 
works in practice. The Ordinance was remarkably simple. It assigned sole 
responsibility to retailers to take back product packaging from consumers 
and established refundable deposits on some types of packaging as a con-
sumer incentive to return the packaging.74 The Ordinance envisioned that 
manufacturers would ultimately assume responsibility for their packaging 
though a provision that exempted retailers from the take-back requirement if 
74 BETTE FISHBEIN, GERMANY, GARBAGE, AND THE GREEN DoT: CHALLENGING THE 
THROWAWAY SOCIETY 21 (1994) [hereinafter FISHBEIN, GERMANY]. 
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their product suppliers established a privately financed system that would 
collect packaging and meet material-specific targets for collection and recy-
cling.75 This feature led retailers to pressure their suppliers, and as a re-
sult, over six hundred German companies joined a Producer Responsibil-
ity Organization ("PRO"), a nonprofit entity that manages packaging drop-
off bins and contracts with packaging recyclers.76 The PRO, rather than 
retailers or the government, now manages the packaging take-back sys-
tem in Germany. 
The German PRO charges manufacturers a license fee to use a "green 
dot" logo on packages, indicating that the package is recyclable,77 and the 
license fee is scaled to the degree of recyclability of the packaging. For 
example, manufacturers that package products in difficult-to-recycle plastics 
pay a fee for the green dot logo that is about seven times higher than for 
products packaged in cardboard, internalizing, to an approximate extent, the 
increased waste management cost of plastic packaging. 78 The program 
has provided incentives for reduced packaging and substitution of pack-
aging materials. For instance, the Ordinance has provided incentives to 
"lightweight," or shift to lighter and less packaging.79 Toothpaste is now 
sold in Germany without the cardboard box around the tube80-useless 
packaging that ends up in the trash in the United States and other countries. 
Following the German Packaging Ordinance, other European coun-
tries enacted product take-back laws for a wide array of products in the 
mid- to late 1990s, including used automobiles (France), batteries (France 
and Norway), major appliances (Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy), 
consumer electronics (Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Swit-
zerland, and the Netherlands), and packaging (France).81 At the suprana-
tional level, the European Union has incorporated EPR principles into 
numerous pieces of waste legislation, including legislation on packaging 
75 ld. at 21-24. 
16 /d. at 50. 
77 See id. at 51-53. In practice, retailers have refused to accept products that do not 
carry the green dot logo, because the retailers do not want the responsibility of sending 
packaging back to suppliers. ld. 
78 See Duales System Deutschland, List of License Fees and Bases of Assessment, 
available at http://www.gruener-punkt.de/uploads/media/20E4.pdf. 
79 See Rousakis & Weintraub, supra note 16, at 967-68. 
80 See generally FISHBEIN, GERMANY, supra note 74, at 42-46. The major responses of 
manufacturers to the Green Dot price incentives have been reducing packaging weight or 
avoiding multi-part packaging and secondary packaging, substituting different kinds of 
packaging, and using more refill packs and concentrates, such as for cleaning detergents. 
See Duales System Deutschland, Putting Packaging on a Diet, available at http://www. 
gruener-punkt.de!Packaging_ optimisation .9 5 + B6Jkw9M Q_. 0 .html. 
81 Michael W. Toffel, Closing the Loop: Product Take-Back Regulations and Their 
Strategic Implications, J. CoRP. SusTAINABILITY, Oct. 2003, at 2-162 to -63 [hereinafter Tof-
fel, Closing the Loop]; Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 38, at 15-16; HANS VEDDER, 
COMPETITION LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY: EXPERI-
ENCES IN THE NETHERLANDS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 167-75 (2002); OECD Man-
ual, supra note 15, at 55. 
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(1994),82 used autos (so-called "End-of-Life Vehicles") (2000),83 and elec-
tronics (2003).84 As noted above, the waste legislation is just one compo-
nent of a larger Integrated Product Policy that is likely to be implemented 
throughout the European Union over the next decade. 
The European Union's new waste directives are an ambitious program 
of action that has consolidated waste policy-making in Brussels and, in 
particular, in the Environment Directorate-General of the European Com-
mission. Although the principle of subsidiarity85 would seem to limit cen-
tralized action in the environmental arena in favor of diverse measures by 
the Member States, centralized environmental law-making in the European 
Union has been common. It has usually been justified on the grounds of 
trade harmonization, preventing transboundary pollution, and avoiding an 
inter-jurisdictional "race to the bottom" that may result if individual 
Member States lower environmental standards to attract investment.86 The 
result, as one British scholar has noted, is that the EU's environmental 
program over the past three decades has "been transformed from its ori-
gins as a restricted body of technical standards designed primarily to elimi-
nate trade restrictions into an expansive programme committed to the 
vision of sustainable development and the wholesale integration of envi-
ronmental, social and economic policies."87 
The EU EPR legislation has been enacted in the form of Directives, 
which are required to be transposed into national legislation in each Member 
82 European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC, 1994 OJ (L 365) I 0. The 
Packaging Directive set collection targets of between 50 and 65% of packaging waste and 
a recycling target of between 25 and 45% of total packaging material. /d. It did not itself 
require that producers take responsibility for packaging throughout the EU, but it did state, 
in Article 15, that Member States may implement the Directive in accordance with the 
Polluter Pays Principle. Member States have implemented the Directive through a variety 
of mechanisms and degrees of producer responsibility. See IAN BAILEY, NEw ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACKAGING WASTE DIRECTIVE 67-68, 78-79, 82 (2003). 
83 EU Parliament and Council Directive 2000/53/EC, 2000 OJ (L 269) 34 [hereinafter 
ELY Directive]. The ELY Directive requires automakers to reuse or recycle 85% of the 
auto's weight by 2006, a target that increases to 95% by 2015. See id. at 38. 
84 WEEE Directive, supra note 7. 
85 The subsidiarity principle, contained in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, permits EU insti-
tutions to act "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, supra note 55, art. 5 
86 See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: An Overview, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 69-72 (Revesz, 
Sands, & Stewart eds., 2000) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND Sus-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT). For the WEEE Directive and the Directive on the Restriction of 
the Use of Hazardous Substances ("RoHS Directive"), the Commission justified EU-level 
action on the grounds that pollution from landfilling or incinerating WEEE is of a trans-
boundary nature, economies of scale are necessary to justify the cost of electronics recy-
cling centers, and differing national approaches could disrupt the Internal Market. See 
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 38, at 19. 
87 BAILEY, supra note 82, at 17. 
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State under Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity ("EC Treaty").88 However, given the political complexities of the trans-
position process and the divisions of jurisdiction and responsibility within 
the European Union, issuance of a Directive does not necessarily lead to 
perfect harmonization of national policies. Rather, Member States have 
considerable latitude to determine the mechanisms and policies for im-
plementing the broad EU Directives.89 As a consequence, European nations 
have adopted a wide variety of approaches for product take-back, reflecting 
national priorities, relative political power of industry, and the state of recy-
cling markets. Most of the EPR legislation in Europe relies on munici-
palities and consumers to sort and collect products or packaging, reflecting 
the impracticality and enormous costs of requiring producers to retrieve 
goods from individual households. How responsibility is allocated among 
municipalities, consumers, and producers varies widely. 9° For example, un-
der the EU's Packaging Directive, Member States have established differ-
ent collection mechanisms, ranging from curb-side pick-up by municipali-
ties to consumer drop-off at retailers or municipal collection centers.91 As 
the European Commission noted, the degree of producer responsibility 
ranges from "covering the costs for recovery of glass and paper-cardboard 
only, to systems where industry is bearing the complete costs of collec-
tion, sorting, [and] recycling/recovery for municipal packaging waste."92 
In other words, EPR as practiced in Europe has not meant that responsi-
bility for products rests solely with producers, but European EPR does 
retain the core concept that producers' environmental responsibility for 
products extends beyond the factory door to the post-consumer stage.93 
88 See id. at 6; Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 55, art. 249. 
89 See BAILEY, supra note 82, at 7, 35-36. 
90 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN PACKAGING WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
iii (Feb. 2001). 
91 See ROC ENVIRONMENT & PIRA INTERNATIONAL, EVALUATION OF COSTS AND 
BENEFITS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REUSE AND RECYCLING TARGETS FOR THE DIFFER-
ENT PACKAGING MATERIALS IN THE FRAME OF THE PACKAGING AND PACKAGING WASTE 
DIRECTIVE, Mar. 2003, at IX-XI. 
92 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN PACKAGING WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, 
supra note 90, at iv. The Commission explained that "[t]he coverage of costs between pri-
vate actors ... and public sector ... is mainly a result of the balance of power between 
these actors." /d. at iv. There is also substantial variation in the charges levied on packag-
ing in the Member States under the Packaging Directive. For instance, the fee structure for 
packaging in Germany provides incentives to shift from plastic to glass beverage contain-
ers, while the fee structure in the UK provides the opposite incentive. See BAILEY, supra 
note 82, at 133-34. 
93 As the OECD has noted, EPR assigns ultimate responsibility to the producer, but as-
signing such responsibility "does not change the need for others to participate to ensure 
that the programme is carried out." OECD Manual, supra note 15, at 55. 
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B. Analysis of European EPR Legislation 
1. Success in Spurring Recycling of Products 
European EPR legislation has generally succeeded in achieving ex-
pected downstream impacts and resource benefits-reducing the volume of 
waste headed for landfills and incinerators and reducing virgin materials 
use. For example, in Germany, between 1991 and 1998, annual packaging 
consumption per capita dropped from 94.7 kilograms to 82 kilograms, a 
13.4% decrease. 94 Since the introduction of the Packaging Ordinance in 
1991, about 61 million tons of packaging has been recycled, 95 and according 
to one study, 18% less packaging was used in Germany in 2000 com-
pared with a hypothetical trend line in the absence of the Packaging Or-
dinance.96 
These gains have come at substantial cost, however. The Green Dot sys-
tem in Germany costs about 1.8 billion per year,97 or around $2.27 bil-
lion at the May 2005 exchange rates. A Regulatory Impact Analysis by 
the UK on the EU's new Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equip-
ment ("WEEE") concluded that it would avoid 133,000 to 339,300 tons of 
landfilling in the UK per year, with an estimated cost savings of £2 million 
to £13 million per year.98 However, the same analysis concluded that the 
Directive would cost between £217 and £455 million per year for the UK, 
depending on how it is implemented.99 The Commission's cost estimates 
are lower, in the range of 500-900 million per year for collecting and 
recycling WEEE from fifteen Member States, with an estimated price in-
crease of 1% for most electronic products. 100 The full costs and benefits 
of the WEEE Directive will not be known for several years, but these esti-
mates suggest that some caution is warranted, and they should prompt more 
consideration of alternative mechanisms for addressing product external-
ities in the United States. 
To be comprehensive, any cost-benefit analysis of EPR should include 
resource benefits (avoided energy inputs and avoided virgin material use), 
94 /d. at II. 
95 Duales System Deutschland, Trendsetter Green Dot-prices cut by half in 15 years 
(Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.gruener-punkt.de/index.php?id= 1371&L= l&noFiash= I (on 
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
96 See Joachim Quoden, Effects of the Introduction of an EPR Management System on 
the Economy, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Eco-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 120 (2004) (hereinafter OECD, 
EcoNOMIC AsPECTS OF EPR]. 
97 Duales System Deutschland, What Does the Green Dot Cost? I (Jan. 2004) avail-
able at http://www.dual-system.com/uploads/media/0404_whatdoesitcost.pdf. 
98 U.K DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PARTIAL REGULATORY IMPACT AssESSMENT 
(RIA) ON DIRECTIVE 2002/96/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
ON WASTE FROM ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 21 (2003), available at http:// 
www.dti.gov.uklsustainability/weee/weeeriamarch.pdf. 
99Jd. 
100 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 38, at 22. 
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but doing so is enormously complex. If EPR programs avoid deforestation, 
mining, petroleum refining, air pollution, or greenhouse gas emissions that 
would have otherwise preceded production of new products, how should 
those benefits be quantified? 
Even if such benefits could be quantified, it should also be recognized 
that any policy instrument that stimulates recycling or subsidizes use of 
secondary materials could accomplish many of the same results. In other 
words, the issue of whether the European Union or the United States should 
do more to encourage recycling is quite distinct from the issue of who 
should pay. Curbside collection of beverage containers and newspapers, 
funded by municipalities, is a leading example of a policy that spurs re-
cycling and avoids virgin material extraction without a producer take-
back requirement. Like EPR, existing municipal recycling programs in 
the United States have the benefit of reducing the extraction of raw mate-
rials and helping to reduce the absolute levels of materials flowing through 
industrial economies. 101 Given that existing environmental regulations leave 
product externalities unaddressed, the United States should promote in-
creased recycling and reuse of products that contain hazardous substances, 
such as electronics, but producers need not be the funding source in order 
for these programs to be effective. 
Some scholars have critiqued EPR and other instruments to spur re-
cycling for not going far enough. In this view, such programs are inade-
quate, and possibly counterproductive, because they do nothing to address 
the level of consumption in the developed world, which is the primary 
driver of raw materials and energy use, waste disposal, and environmental 
impacts across the globe. 102 Focusing attention on producer responsibility 
101 Policies promoting recycling and reuse are one potential means of reducing "through-
put" in industrial economies-the total amount of materials processed through the econ-
omy into finished goods and services and resulting wastes. A remarkable study by the World 
Resources Institute concluded that one half to three quarters of all raw material inputs in 
five OECD economies studied are returned to the environment as wastes within a year. WORLD 
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE WEIGHT OF NATIONS 6 (2000) (examining trends in Austria, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and the United States). The study also found that while pol-
lution per unit of GOP has been declining in the five countries since 1975, primarily be-
cause of improved technological efficiency and a shift toward service-based economies, pollu-
tion has increased dramatically on an absolute basis between 1975 and 1996 (up twenty-
eight percent in the United States). /d. at 19. The authors attribute the absolute rise to 
"[c]ultural factors and consumption choices [that] have helped to offset the real efficiency 
gains that have been made in industry .... In the absence of further policy incentives, struc-
tural economic change and technological efficiency gains alone appear unlikely to bring about 
a real reduction in resource use and waste output." /d. at 20. 
102 See Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past Con-
sumer Culture, 26 EcoLOGY L.Q. 543, 545 (1999) (noting that "environmental policy has 
accepted consumers' desires as being immutable even though the destructive consequences 
of fulfilling them have been undeniable."); Salzman, Sustainable Consumption, supra note 
8, at 1280. Agenda 21, adopted by consensus at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
declared that "the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment is 
the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized coun-
tries .... " See Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-
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or increasing recycling may constitute a license for consumers to continue 
their unsustainable, high-consumption lifestyles. As several scholars ar-
gued in a recent book called Confronting Consumption, technological or 
policy fixes for reducing the environmental impacts of consumption are 
insufficient without efforts to reduce consumption itself: 
[E]veryone has become adept at talking about sustainability with-
out having to wade into the treacherous waters of consumption 
.... Consumption occasionally enters the discussion, but only in 
nonthreatening ways, and most often in the form of calls for 
"green consumption" or in support of some moral imperative to 
consume recycled or recyclable products. Much of this sustainable 
development talk steers clear of escalating consumption levels 
and, especially, the roots of such escalation. 103 
As another scholar put it, "consumers ought to consume less, not just 
consume differently" 104 and "government should encourage consumers to 
question whether the desire they seek to satisfy is best satisfied through eco-
nomic exchange, or if it is indeed appropriate at all." 105 
These critiques are too rigid, however. To be sure, rising consumption 
in affluent countries is a major driver of global environmental degradation 
and, notably, does not even seem to correlate with measures of human satis-
faction. 106 But given expanding economies and increasing consumption, re-
ducing landfill impacts and avoiding energy inputs and virgin material im-
pacts through recycling is an important agenda. 107 Environmentalists should 
be encouraging countries to move toward this agenda, and it is a recipe 
for stasis to critique this agenda for not pursuing more dramatic goals of 
reducing how much consumers consume. 
14, 1992, Annex II, Agenda 21, 'l[4.3., U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
103 Thomas Princen et al., Confronting Consumption, in CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION 
I, 1-2 (Princen et al. eds., MIT Press 2002). The authors are critical of the focus of main-
stream environmental groups on technological improvements in production, and they are 
especially critical of academic economists, who, they claim, ignore questions of "whether 
and how consumption patterns contribute to or solve social and environmental problems." 
!d. at 9, II. 
104 Harsch, supra note 102, at 573. 
105 !d. at 578. 
106 See generally GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX 163-87 (2003) (summa-
rizing studies that show steady or declining evaluations of subjective well-being since 
World War II amidst unprecedented gains in material living standards); Harsch, supra note 
102, at 582-85. 
107 As the European Commission has noted, overall use of products is increasing be-
cause of greater disposable income and because decreasing household size means that 
there is a greater duplication of household products. Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament-Integrated Product Policy: Building on Life-
Cycle Thinking, at 3, COM (2003) 302 Final (June 18, 2003), available at http://europa.eu. 
int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0302enOI.pdf. The EU's new Integrated Product 
Policy does not address the level of consumption in Europe, but it is designed to "reduce 
the environmental impacts of increased quantities of products." /d. 
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2. Difficulty of Achieving Product Redesign Goals 
If EPR is similar to other recycling programs in achieving downstream 
impacts and resource benefits, then what is the added value of producer 
responsibility? What are the advantages of the EU's product-oriented leg-
islation, which assigns responsibility for product environmental impacts to 
producers, compared to the regime in the United States, which leaves waste 
management responsibility with municipalities but includes various recy-
cling programs and incentives? 
One possible answer is that it is only through producer responsibility 
that manufacturers will have an incentive, through the take-back obliga-
tion, to change the design of their products to have reduced impacts on the 
environment. In economic terms, a substitution incentive for producers 
(shifting to less toxic or more recyclable materials) could arguably lower 
the overall costs of recycling compared to funding recycling without pro-
ducer involvement. 
Providing incentives for ecological design of products is a kind of holy 
grail for EPR proponents, and advocates argue that the design incentives 
are the primary rationale for involving product manufacturers in end-of-life 
waste management. 108 However, Europe has had only limited success in 
implementing product-oriented environmental policies to provide such de-
sign incentives, reflecting the difficulties of shaping the design of millions of 
products in countries with advanced economies. 
Firms will have design incentives under an EPR program only if 
there is true cost-internalization [hereinafter "individual responsibility"], 
where firms both bear the end-of-life costs of their product design decisions 
and can capture cost-savings under a take-back mandate through redes-
igning products to be more ecologically friendly. Individual responsibil-
ity can occur, for example, if firms physically take back and dismantle or 
recycle their own products. This form of responsibility is akin to a prod-
uct lease (imposed by legislation rather than by contract), where the manu-
facturer retains a reversionary right in the product that is triggered upon 
the consumer's decision to discard. 109 Individual responsibility can also be 
lOS See OECD Manual, supra note 15, at 19. 
109 Leasing is widely seen as a model for larger-scale implementation of EPR. Many 
large American companies, including Xerox, IBM, and Dell, already lease a substantial 
proportion of the products they manufacture. See Bette K. Fishbein et al., INFORM Inc., 
LEASING: A STEP TOWARD PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 5-6 (2000). While the impetus for 
leasing is not usually environmental, lease arrangements do provide incentives for manu-
facturers to design products for durability and recyclability, and to use repair and remanu-
facturing to extend the life of products. See id. (noting that "[c]ompanies that get back 
large amounts of products through their leasing systems have an increased awareness of 
the costs of managing these products as waste, of the potential for enhancing and recaptur-
ing end-of-life value, and of the manufacturing processes that can facilitate remanufactur-
ing and recycling"). Xerox, for example, has instituted an Asset Recycle Management program 
aimed at reusing copiers and other products returned at the end of leases, rather than dis-
carding them. The program avoids disposal costs, and Xerox asset recovery engineers work 
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achieved if firms are assigned economic responsibility for waste manage-
ment of their own products, such as through paying a fee that approximates 
the disposal costs and environmental externalities of each of the firm's 
products, as under the German Packaging Ordinance. 
It is difficult to see how true cost-internalization can be achieved for 
more complex products, such as electronics, which contain a chemical stew 
of metals, plastics, liquids, glass, and housings. Fees on manufacturers, 
to provide incentives for improved design, would have to reflect a wide 
array of product characteristics, such as weight, bulk, chemical constitu-
ents of the product, and degree of recyclability. True cost internalization 
would require some estimate, by a government regulator or potentially by 
an industry coalition such as a PRO, of the present value of future waste 
management costs and environmental externalities. In other words, fees 
would need to be tailored not just to a product class made by several manu-
facturers, such as a microwave, air conditioner, or computer, but to a firm's 
individual products and models, such as the GE Spacemaker XL 1800 mi-
crowave, the Kenmore 72056 air conditioner, or the Dell Dimension 4700 
desktop computer. 
If EPR were implemented through a physical take-back system rather 
than up-front fees, products would have to be tracked and sorted out of 
the waste stream by brand name-a daunting bureaucratic challenge with 
very high transaction costs. 110 Even under a system funded by front-end 
fees paid by producers to put a product on the market, the targeted prod-
ucts still need to be separately collected at the back end, after consumer 
use, to keep them out of the waste stream. 
EPR programs will fail to provide a strong ecological design incen-
tive if firms are assigned economic responsibility for their products based 
on factors such as market-share, product type, or the mere fact of being a 
producer of a targeted product [hereinafter "collective responsibility"]. Col-
lective responsibility may internalize some waste management costs by 
shifting them from municipalities to industry, and it may lead to some design 
changes merely by making manufacturers more aware of the waste implica-
tions of their products. But any design incentives will be weak. Firms have 
no particular incentive to improve the environmental profile of their own 
products if they know that they will be charged for end-of-life waste man-
agement in conjunction with their industry group as a whole and that the 
fee will not be scaled for environmental impacts. 
directly with product design engineers to improve recyclability, ease of disassembly, and 
other design issues that will lower the cost of end-of-life management of Xerox's products. 
/d. at 6-8. 
110 See NAOKO TOJO, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS, EPR PROGRAMMES: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: EXPLOR-
ING VARIOUS fORMS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND THEIR IMPLICATION TO DESIGN CHANGE 53 
(2003), available at http://www.cleanproduction.org/CD/EPR_IndivVersusCollective2003.pdf 
(reporting on interviews with European recyclers who noted problems with sorting various 
products by brand, including the space needed to separate the goods and the labor costs). 
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Of course, the exact effects of collective responsibility would depend on 
the structure of the market. If one or two companies are dominant in a 
particular product category and have substantial market-share, then a col-
lective mandate could force design changes, depending on the marginal 
costs and benefits of doing so. This is one reason why the effectiveness 
of EPR must be assessed on a product-by-product basis. 
Environmental policy makers are confronted with a clear trade-off 
between individual and collective responsibility. Individual responsibility 
shapes the design of products through cost-internalization, yet it involves 
large transaction costs of tracking and sorting millions of products, or as-
sessing fees calibrated to approximate the environmental impacts and dis-
posal costs for each product. Collective responsibility provides weak in-
centives for product redesign, yet it is far more economical to implement 
on a national scale. 111 
Many EU EPR programs have defaulted to collective responsibility as a 
matter of practical necessity, despite the theoretical advantages of indi-
vidual responsibility. Take, for example, the EU's recent electronics directive 
on WEEE which establishes a product take-back requirement and mandatory 
recycling targets for discarded electronics within the EU Member States. 112 
The Directive covers a broad array of products such as large and small 
household appliances; information technology and telecommunications 
equipment; electric tools; consumer equipment; lighting; electronic tools; 
toys and sports equipment; medical devices; and automatic dispensers. 113 
The WEEE Directive requires that Member States provide "convenient 
facilities" for consumers to return WEEE at no charge by August 2005. 114 
The collection function will most likely be performed by municipalities, 
and retailers are also required to take back a product free-of-charge when 
a customer buys a new, similar product. Once collected, responsibility for 
managing the WEEE shifts to producers, who must set up treatment and 
recycling systems. 115 
While the WEEE Directive squarely involves electronics manufac-
turers in end-of-life waste management, it is unlikely to provide significant 
incentives for improved ecological design of products. The WEEE Direc-
tive imposes collective responsibility on producers, for instance, for manag-
111 Margaret Walls, a leading economist who has studied EPR programs, describes the 
trade-off as "simplicity and flexibility coupled with minimal incentives for DfE [Design 
for the Environment] on the one hand, versus complexity and high administrative and 
monitoring costs combined with sharp DfE incentives on the other." See Walls, EPR Policy 
Goals and Policy Choices: What Does Economics Tell Us?, in OECD, ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
OF EPR, supra note 96, at 37. She concludes that policy-makers must recognize and grap-
ple with these tradeoffs "sooner rather than later." /d. 
112 WEEE Directive, supra note 7. 
113 !d., Annex lA, at 33. 
114 /d., pmbl. §§ 15 & 20, at 25; id., art. 5, § 2(a), at 28. 
115 !d., pmbl. § 17 at 25; id., art. 6, 'l[l, at 28. To facilitate the take-back mechanism, 
each producer must place a unique visual identifier on its products sold within the EU that 
are subject to the WEEE Directive. /d., art. II, 'll 2, at 31. 
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ing "historic waste" already on the market, where there can be no design 
incentives. 116 For "new" products placed on the market after August 2005, 
the WEEE Directive states that "each producer shall be responsible for 
financing [treatment and recovery operations] relating to the waste from 
his own products," 117 which seems to be a straightforward pronouncement 
in favor of individual responsibility. Indeed, inserting this provision was 
a major objective of the European Environmental Bureau, a Brussels-based 
umbrella group for 134 European environmental organizations. 118 
However, the Directive then adds that "[t]he producer can choose to 
fulfill this [financing] obligation either individually or by joining a col-
lective scheme." 119 In other words, the WEEE Directive acknowledges the 
goal of individual responsibility, but in allowing participation in collective 
schemes, such as Producer Responsibility Organizations, the Directive may 
defeat the objectives of individual responsibility and cost-internalization 
in the long run. As INFORM, Inc., a leading U.S. supporter of the WEEE 
Directive notes: 
How individual responsibility could be implemented in a collec-
tive system is unclear. The challenge is to arrive at a fee structure 
that reflects the actual cost of recycling a specific product. Such 
systems have been developed for packaging by basing fees on 
weight and material composition. However, this would be far more 
difficult for complex electrical and electronic products, which 
may contain hundreds of different types of materials. 120 
While it is too early to determine all the details of how each Member 
State will choose to implement the WEEE Directive, it does appear that 
many large Member States are not implementing the Directive on an in-
dividual responsibility basis. A comprehensive study in January 2005 of 
how the WEEE Directive was being transposed in Member States showed 
that several large states, such as France and Germany, were implementing 
collective-responsibility systems in which manufacturers jointly manage 
116 /d., pmbl. § 20, at 25; id., art. 8, 'li 3, at 30. For WEEE discarded by non-household 
users, the Directive originally required producers to fund collection and recovery of his-
torical waste. /d., art. 9, at 30. However, recognizing the enormous liability this might impose, 
the EU, in 2003, passed an Amendment that stated that funding for "historical waste" must 
come from producers only when the products are being replaced by new equivalent prod-
ucts. Historical waste must be funded by non-household consumers when the WEEE is not 
being replaced by new equivalent products. See Directive 2003/108/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of the 8 December 2003 amending Directive 2002/96/EC on 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), 2003 O.J. (L 345) 106. 
117 WEEE Directive, supra note 7, art. 8, 'li 2, at 30. 
118 See INFORM, INC., THE WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES: HIGHLIGHTS AND ANALY-
SIS (2003), available at http://www.informinc.org/fact_ WEEE.pdf [hereinafter INFORM, 
INC., THE WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES]. 
119 WEEE Directive, supra note 7, art. 8, 'li 2, at 30. 
120 INFORM, INc., THE WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES, supra note 118, at 1. 
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the WEEE waste stream, though allowing individual producers to opt for 
individual responsibility for their own products (such as through paying 
extra to have their individual products sorted at collection points). 121 
Furthermore, many of the existing Producer Responsibility Organiza-
tions for electronics in the European Union (created in response to national 
EPR legislation that predated the WEEE Directive) are implementing prod-
uct take-back without any incentives for changing the design of products. 
The Swedish PRO for electronics, EI-Kretsen AB, charges producers flat 
fees to put products on the market, such as up to 180 SEK for a television, 
7 SEK for a VCR or DVD player, and 45 SEK for a dishwasher. 122 The Bel-
gian PRO for electronics, Recupel, also charges flat fees, such as 1.5 euros 
for a car stereo, 20 euros for a refrigerator, and 2 euros for a circular saw. 123 
These flat fees may reflect differences in waste management costs among 
product classes, but they provide little incentive for a manufacturer within a 
product class to alter the design of its products, such as by reducing toxic 
constituents or dioxin-forming plastics, or to design the product for recy-
clability.124 In the Netherlands in 2003, IT manufacturers switched from a 
take-back system of individual responsibility for their own brands to a col-
lective system with costs allocated based on market-share, principally be-
cause of the logistics of implementing individual responsibility and asso-
ciated problems of free riders (producers who never register with the sys-
tem) and orphan products (products from defunct producers). 125 
In short, the evidence from the European Union strongly suggests that 
high transaction costs hinder achievement of cost-internalization and de-
sign incentives through EPR, at least for products that are more complex 
than packaging. The WEEE Directive will likely achieve one of its major 
goals-reducing the amount of WEEE sent to landfills and incinerators-
but it appears unlikely to provide significant incentives to change product 
design, undermining one of the primary arguments of EPR proponents. If 
collective responsibility is the primary mechanism through which EPR is 
121 See generally PERCHARDS, REPORT TO DIVISION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, TRANSPOSITION OF THE WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES IN OTHER EU 
MEMBER STATES (2005). 
122 See EL-KRETSEN AB, PRODUCT LIST AND FEES (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http:// 
www.el-kretsen.se/EI-Kretsen%20i%20Sverige%20AB-filer/English/Pricelist%2005_v2.pdf. 
123 See RECUPEL, RECUPEL ET L'OBLIGATION DE REPRISE DES APPAREILS UsAGES: 
LISTE DE PRODUITS 2005-2006, NoUVEAUX TARIFS, NOUVEAUX PRODUITS (2005), avail-
able at http://www.recupel.be/recupeUpdf/fardeinfo.pdf. 
124 See Catherine M. Rose & Ab Steve Is, Applying Value Chain Analysis to Product 
Take-Back Systems § 4.6, available at http://www.productstewardship.us/supportingdocs/ 
AppEnviroSys.pdf (last visited Dec. I, 2005) (noting that in three out of four European 
take-back systems studied, the take-back mechanism provided no incentive to make less 
wasteful or more recyclable products). The one take-back system studied that did provide 
such incentives was a physical take-back program organized voluntarily by Siemens in 
Germany for its own products. See id. at § 4.5. 
125 ToJO, supra note I 10, at 25-26. See also OECD Manual, supra note 15, at 85-87 
(discussing ways in which problems of free-riders and orphaned products can complicate 
EPR administration). 
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implemented, the expectation that EPR will lead to a new era of "design 
for the environment" and improved environmental performance of products 
is likely a false hope. 
Significantly, if EPR fails to achieve substantial improvements in prod-
uct design, then it loses one of its theoretical advantages over other policy 
instruments that reduce landfill impacts and spur recycling without pro-
ducer involvement. There seems little point in undertaking the logistical 
challenge of EPR if producers are just a conduit for passing along collective 
waste management costs back to consumers through higher product prices. 
3. Significant State Involvement 
A major reason that EPR is hailed as a "next-generation" environmental 
policy is that it seems to rely on economic incentives rather than com-
mand-and-control regulatory requirements. Under EPR theory, assigning 
responsibility to producers does not dictate any particular product design, 
but rather allows producers to assess the marginal costs and benefits of 
product redesign, given the prospect of product take-back or the fee struc-
ture imposed for waste management. But the market-based aspects of EPR 
may be overstated. In fact, as practiced in the European Union, EPR in-
volves substantial regulatory mandates and does dictate product design 
decisions in certain respects. The most far-reaching impacts of the new 
EU waste legislation are likely to result from these command-and-control 
mandates rather than from the more market-based mechanism of the product 
take-back requirements. 
One significant regulatory mandate in EU EPR legislation is the manda-
tory recycling requirements for various product classes or packaging types, 
which are designed to stimulate recycling substantially over what the market 
would justify ex ante. For instance, under the End-of-Life Vehicle Direc-
tive, auto manufacturers must achieve a minimum 80% recycling rate by 
weight by January 1, 2006, and 85% by January 1, 2015. 126 Under the 
WEEE Directive, recycling mandates range from 50% to 80% by weight 
for the various electronic product classes. 127 Even if landfilling is more 
economically efficient than recycling for a particular product or for pack-
aging, EPR legislation in the European Union requires recycling. 
Mandatory recycling requirements are important components of EPR 
programs, as there would be no point in separately collecting products under 
an EPR program if producers or their contractors were permitted to landfill 
or incinerate the products once collected. Yet given that the recycling re-
quirements are set ex ante by government officials and are designed to be 
market-forcing, they can lead to significant disruptions in materials mar-
kets. The German Packaging Ordinance set such a high target for packaging 
126 See ELY Directive, supra note 83, art. 7, '1!2, at 38. 
127 WEEE Directive, supra note 7, art. 7, '1!2, at 29. 
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recycling in its initial years that it led to a flood of collected packaging 
that could not be handled by Germany's recycling infrastructure, resulting 
in large costs for storage, dumping on other European markets, and exports 
of waste to developing countries. 128 In I 993, for example, Germany col-
lected 414,000 tons of plastics while its total recycling capacity for all 
materials was 165,000 tons annually. 129 Furthermore, if the recycling re-
quirements are too onerous, they can lead to substantial production of sec-
ondary materials without corresponding demand from customers willing 
to buy it. 
Because recycling usually involves substantial energy consumption and 
capital investment in heavy machinery (particularly for recycling durable 
goods and electronics), some have argued that the environmental benefits of 
recycling versus landfilling or incineration are not always clear. 130 European 
studies that have attempted to calculate the life cycle costs and benefits of 
landfilling versus recycling of WEEE have generated divergent results. 131 
The benefits of recycling versus landfilling for various product classes· 
need to be carefully considered, and recycling targets must be realistic to 
correspond with recycling capacity and the potential markets for secon-
dary materials. 
A second area of substantial state involvement in European EPR pro-
grams is that the responsibility for collecting targeted products from house-
holds is usually assigned to municipal governments. The collection proc-
ess is a large proportion of overall waste management costs. Separate collec-
tion of targeted EPR product classes, which usually involves special bins 
or trucks or establishment of central drop-off points, may actually increase 
costs for municipalities, even if landfill disposal volumes for the targeted 
products decrease. While EPR is often described in the literature as shift-
ing a relatively fixed set of waste management costs from municipalities to 
producers, 132 in practice costs for both municipalities and producers may 
increase under EPR programs. Again, these costs of separate collection need 
to be carefully considered in the initial theoretical discussion of where to 
assign responsibility for product externalities. 
Finally, state intervention within European EPR programs is most 
prominent in the product design mandates that accompany many of the take-
back requirements. In practice, European EPR legislation has dictated 
product design in several crucial areas. For example, the WEEE Directive 
128 See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 82, at 71; Ariane Genillard, Recycling Has Neighbors 
Crying Foul: On Complaints of Cheap Waste Exports to European Countries, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 1994, at 6; Dean E. Murphy, Germany's Recycling Nightmare: Once the Envy of 
Europe, the Nation's Program is Being Buried Under Trash from Diligent Consumers, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, at 03; Steven P. Reynolds, The German Recycling Experiment and 
Its Lessons for United States Policy, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 52-55 (1995). 
129 Reynolds, supra note 128, at 52 n.49. 
130 See Rousakis & Weintraub, supra note 16, at 959-60. 
131 Toffel, Closing the Loop, supra note 81, at 2-167. 
132 See, e.g., Fishbein, EPR: What Does it Mean?, supra note 65, at 53-54. 
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was enacted in tandem with the Directive on the Restriction of the Use of 
Hazardous Substances ("RoHS Directive"), which bans several toxic sub-
stances from electrical products after July 2006. 133 Specifically, the RoHS 
Directive bans lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybro-
minated biphenyls, and polybrominated diphenyl ethers from most of the 
same categories of products covered by the WEEE Directive. 134 Similarly, 
the End-of-Life Vehicle Directive bans lead, mercury, cadmium, and hexava-
lent chromium in autos put on the market after July 1, 2003. 135 
These design mandates directly force removal of toxic constituents 
from products, and their use in the European Union strongly suggests that a 
take-back requirement alone would not be sufficient to spur producers to 
remove hazardous materials from products. Indeed, according to many 
electronics manufacturers, it is the RoHS Directive rather than the take-
back requirement under the WEEE Directive that is now prompting major 
changes in how electronics are produced globally. 136 Pursuant to the RoHS 
Directive, for example, manufacturers are actively finding substitutes for 
lead solder and mercury switches in electronics. 137 An old fashioned com-
mand-and-control chemical ban, which directly inserts government into 
the research and development labs of manufacturers, appears to be a far 
more powerful driver of changes in product design than the take-back re-
quirement. 
Given the amount of state control and the centrality of the RoHS sub-
stance ban, advocates are likely overstating how market-based EPR really 
is. 138 The RoHS substance ban is a useful tool for improving the ecologi-
cal profile of electronics, and Part V of this Article advocates that the United 
States enact similar content standards in conjunction with new methods 
to fund electronics recycling. 
133 Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 
2003 on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Elec-
tronic Equipment, 2003 0.1. (L 37) 19 [hereinafter RoHS Directive]. 
134 /d. art. 4, 'II 1, at 21. The RoHS Directive contains several exceptions to the substance 
bans for products for which no chemical substitutes were available, such as mercury in 
certain types of fluorescent lamps, or lead as a radiation shield in CRTs. See id., Annex at 
23. 
135 ELY Directive, supra note 83, art. 4, 'II 2(a), at 37. Lead and cadmium in car batter-
ies and a few other automotive uses are temporarily exempt. /d. Annex II, at 37. 
136 See, e.g., INFORM, INC., IMPACT OF THE RoHS DIRECTIVE ON ELECTRONIC PROD-
UCTS SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES I (2003) [hereinafter INFORM, INC., RoHS IMPACT] 
(describing response to RoHS of manufacturers such as Panasonic and Sony and noting 
that "major electronics manufacturers generally make design changes and adopt new tech-
nologies on a global scale, affecting all of their products regardless of where they are manu-
factured and sold"). See also Marla Cone, Europe's Rules Forcing U.S. Firms to Clean Up, 
L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at AI; Toshio Aritake, Japanese Electronics Makers Outline 
Plans for Early Compliance with EU Directives, BNA INT'L ENv'T REP., Feb. 23, 2005, at 
117. 
137 See INFORM, INC., RoHS IMPACT, supra note 136, at I. 
138 For examples of scholarship describing EPR as market-based, see Fishbein, EPR: 
What Does It Mean?, supra note 65, at 55; Kroepelien, supra note 8, at 168. 
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C. Implications of Product-Oriented Environmental Legislation 
If EPR is the leading edge of a wave of product-oriented legislation 
under the EU's Integrated Product Policy, what are its implications for envi-
ronmental regulation in the European Union, and in the United States? If 
environmental policy begins to focus on the environmental impacts of prod-
ucts themselves, supplementing the traditional focus on regulating par-
ticular industrial sources of pollution, how will firms and regulatory agen-
cies adapt? A few important implications deserve mention. 
First, there will likely be very different enforcement challenges under 
product-oriented environmental regulations compared to enforcing facil-
ity discharge and emissions limits. Under a facility-based regime, a few 
dozen or a few hundred major industrial sources need to be monitored and 
policed, but the success of EPR legislation involves the actions of mil-
lions of consumers (in returning their products for collection) and thou-
sands of municipalities and producers. Regulators will likely face sub-
stantial obstacles in monitoring and punishing violators, such as produc-
ers who put products on the market without paying an EPR fee, or pro-
ducers who overstate their recycling figures. 139 On the other hand, the conse-
quences of such non-compliance under product-oriented legislation are 
likely to be less grave for the environment than major industrial sources ex-
ceeding discharge or emissions limits. 
Problems of enforcement and monitoring are similar whether an EPR 
program is implemented by a government entity or through a private Pro-
ducer Responsibility Organization, as under the German Packaging Ordi-
nance. Key objectives would be to minimize free-riding, both by consumers 
(who might use collection bins for non-covered waste) and by producers 
(who might falsely identify their products as part of an EPR system). En-
forcement and monitoring issues "are not insignificant for a country the 
size of Germany, and they would be monumental for a country as popu-
lous and geographically large as the U.S." 140 
Product-oriented legislation will likely prompt some rethinking about 
desired levels of enforcement. While some enforcement of EPR regulations 
will be important as a deterrent, the regime as a whole will likely need to 
tolerate an inevitable degree of free-riding and non-compliance. Sustaining 
compliance of the system as a whole, through soft instruments such as con-
sumer education campaigns and incentives for retailer and municipal co-
operation, will ultimately be more important for the success of product-
oriented environmental policies than enforcing against particular instances of 
non-compliance. The primary objective of policy-makers would be to gain 
widespread consumer and producer "buy-in" for the goals of the program. 
139 Palmer & Walls, supra note 69, at 7. 
140 /d. 
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Enforcement of the EU Directives poses particular challenges because 
environmental enforcement in the European Union is a two-level game. 
Member States have primary authority to enforce the legislation they en-
act pursuant to the EU Directives. They are monitored to some extent by 
the Commission, but the Commission has only weak powers to discipline 
Member States for failing to carry out the Directives. 141 Problems of en-
forcement, including gaining access to accurate information, can arise at 
both stages of the game. Indeed, numerous scholars have recognized a 
growing implementation gap in EU environmental law, where Member 
States have been slow to transpose Directives into legislation, where na-
tional legislation often differs substantially from what was intended at the 
EU level, and where Member States do not enforce their own legislation 
effectively. 142 The WEEE and RoHS Directives began inauspiciously on 
this front. Twenty-four of the twenty-five Member States missed the Au-
gust 2004 deadline to transpose the Directives into nationallegislation. 143 
Successful implementation of product-oriented legislation such as 
EPR, which focuses on the back end of the product chain, is highly de-
pendent on collection of goods from consumers prior to recycling. Regard-
less of the level of compliance by producers, if consumers do not cooper-
ate in separating the targeted items, or if municipalities manage to collect 
only small amounts of the targeted items, the goals of EPR will be difficult 
to achieve, and products not separately collected will still be sent to 
landfills and incinerators. For example, the WEEE Directive requires that 
each Member State separately collect four kilos of WEEE per capita an-
nually, 144 but four kilos is an aggregate figure across all product categories, 
meaning that the target could be met by collecting heavy appliances such 
as air conditioners and refrigerators. If that occurs, and lighter products such 
as cell phones or cordless phones are not collected, then the recycling tar-
gets that apply to those products will be rendered meaningless. 145 Prod-
uct-oriented policies designed to spur recycling must therefore ensure that 
an adequate collection system is in place to supply the recycling facili-
ties. 
Finally, the cross-border trade implications of environmental regimes 
focusing on products are far greater than for regimes that target fixed in-
dustrial sources of pollution. In the European Union, the EPR Directives 
141 See BAILEY, supra note 82, at 38-39. For a description of the procedures under 
which the Commission enforces against a Member State for failure to implement a Direc-
tive, see JEAN-PIERRE HANNEQUART, EuROPEAN WASTE LAW 36-38 (1998). 
142 BAILEY, supra note 82, at 36-39. See also Stephen Breyer & Verle Heyvaert, Insti-
tutions for Regulating Risk, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 86, 335-36. 
143 See Press Release, European Commission, Electronic Waste: Two Important Direc-
tives Due to be Implemented in EU Member States, (Aug. 13, 2004), available at http:// 
europa.eu. int/rapid/pressReleasesActi on .do ?reference= IP/04/1 03 3. 
144 WEEE Directive, supra note 7, at art. 5, '115. 
145 INFORM, INc., THE WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES, supra note 118. 
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have been enacted pursuant to Articles 175 and 176 of the EC Treaty, relat-
ing to environmental protection, and those provisions provide that the EU 
Directives serve as a floor that Member States are permitted to exceed. 146 
For instance, Member States may establish higher recycling targets, stricter 
timetables, or more reporting requirements, or they may apply the Direc-
tives to additional classes of products. Industry groups are concerned that 
such national variation in laws applying to products sold across Europe 
will be trade distorting and is antithetical to the Common Market. 147 Similar 
concerns may arise in the United States under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, if individual states begin to enact product take-back legislation or 
specific product content standards, in the absence of Congressional action. 148 
On the international plane, policies that address externalities from 
products have a global reach and can affect manufacturing practices around 
the globe, unlike facility-based regulation, which is necessarily restricted 
to sources within a jurisdiction. As noted above, the RoHS Directive is lead-
ing to major changes in electronics manufacturing in the United States, 
Europe, and Asia, as manufacturers seek substitutes for the substances 
banned under the Directive. 
By focusing on products directly, countries are implicitly extending 
their jurisdictional reach in environmental policy. In theory, this could lead 
to a "race to the bottom" (as countries relax product standards to encourage 
foreign investment), but more likely, it will lead to a "race to the top" as a 
few large markets with stringent product policies (such as the European 
Union or Japan) are able to "export" their policies globally because foreign 
manufacturers will not want to be shut off from lucrative markets. Smaller 
foreign manufacturers that cannot easily retool their factories to serve 
different markets may be placed at a disadvantage. Will product-oriented 
environmental policies be used as disguised protectionist measures to 
favor local industry? Will such measures be deemed to be in conflict with 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"), even if the measures 
are facially neutral, i.e., take-back requirements apply equally to domestic 
146 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 55, art. 176. 
147 See DETAILED POSITION OF 0RGALIME'S ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC LIAISON COM-
MITTEE (EELC) IN CoOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN SECTOR COMMITTEES ON THE WEEE 
AND RoHS DIRECTIVES 4 (Sept. 5, 2000) (noting that basing waste directives on Article 
175 of the Treaty will lead to "differing national approaches and market distortions"); THE 
EU COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INITIAL DISCUSSION PAPER 
ON THE PROPOSED WEEE AND RoHS DIRECTIVES (Oct. 5, 2000) (arguing that if waste 
directives are based on Article 175, "[m]anufacturers will have to deal with variations of 
the same law in each member state."). 
148 Because product-oriented environmental legislation would likely apply equally to 
products produced in a state and outside a state, courts would likely consider such legisla-
tion to be facially neutral, and any Dormant Commerce Clause would likely be considered 
under the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Under this 
test, courts will sustain the regulatory measure as long as it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest, the effects on interstate commerce are incidental, and the burden on 
interstate commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to the state's asserted interest. See 
id. at 142. 
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and foreign producers? While the GATT implications of product-oriented 
environmental legislation are beyond the scope of this Article, these are 
critical questions that policy-makers need to address. The American Elec-
tronics Association has already prepared a detailed position paper on why 
the WEEE Directive and bans on certain toxic substances in electronics vio-
late the GATT. 149 On the other hand, one scholar has concluded that, at 
least with respect to packaging, take-back requirements would be deemed 
GATT-compliant or would fall under GATT's Article XX exception for 
measures related to conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 150 
IV. EPR IN THE UNITED STATES 
In contrast to Europe, the United States has not enacted product take-
back legislation on a wide scale, and it has no comprehensive product policy 
to speak of. Numerous analysts have studied the differences in political 
culture between the United States and Europe that might explain the greater 
willingness in the European Union to impose new environmental obliga-
tions on producers. 151 Relevant differences that have been cited include a 
stronger conception of individual and property rights in the United States, 
the legacy of the western frontier and the relative abundance of open space 
in the United States, and a greater mistrust of government in the United 
States. 152 A Presidential model of government may contribute to more envi-
ronmental gridlock compared to a parliamentary model, as legislators have 
less incentive to adopt the President's agenda (particularly if different parties 
control the Congress and White House) or concern themselves with issues of 
149 See AMERICAN ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION, PoSITION OF THE AMERICAN ELECTRON-
ICS ASSOCIATION (AEA) ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON WASTE 
FROM ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (WEEE) (1999), available at http://www. 
svtc.org/cleancc/weee/directive/weeeaea.htm (arguing that the EU's proposed electronics 
substance bans would infringe GATT's prohibitions on quantitative restrictions as well as 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade); NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., 
LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN: THE GROWTH OF TRADE BARRIERS THAT IGNORE SOUND 
SCIENCE 72-73 (2003), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/white%20paper/TR2%20 
final.pdf (noting conflicts between the RoHS Directive and the GATT). For a detailed re-
sponse from an environmental organization, see CLEAN CoMPUTER CAMPAIGN, ANALYSIS 
OF THE AEA CLAIMS THAT THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON WASTE FROM ELEC-
TRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (WEEE DIRECTIVE) WILL CONFLICT WITH THE WTO 
TRADE RuLES ( 1999), available at http://www.svtc.org/cleancc/weee/euweee/directive/ccc_ 
aea.htm. 
150 See Salzman, Sustainable Consumption, supra note 8, at 1284. 
151 See generally Breyer & Heyvaert, supra note 142; Marco Verweij, Why is the River 
Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes (Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 LAW & Soc'y REV. 
1007 (2000); Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 
OxFORD J.L. STUD. 165, 166 (1997) (explaining that the United States has a "uniquely aggres-
sive" legal culture and that in no other country are "political decisions, such as the drawing 
of electoral district lines or the formulation of pollution control standards, so often re-
examined and reversed by judges"). 
152 See, e.g., William E. Kilbourne et al., A Multinational Examination of the Role of 
the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes of University Students, 33 ENv'T & 
BEHAV. 209 (2001); Verweij, supra note 151, at 1029-36. 
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implementation within the executive branch. 153 There are numerous access 
points in the American system for industry to block efforts to impose new 
environmental regulations, through campaign contributions, lobbying, and 
judicial challenges. In contrast, European institutions, and especially the 
European Commission, are more politically insulated and technocratic, with 
weak channels of formal influence by interest groups. 154 
Another potential reason for the lack of major product legislation in 
the United States is that the time period within which waste disposal has 
become a more pressing policy problem (about twenty-five years) corre-
sponds to the rise of the political right in the White House, Congress, and 
state houses across the United States. In the past ten years, while interest 
in EPR has intensified in Europe, the Republican Party has gained control 
of both houses of Congress, then the White House. There has not been a 
major environmental statute passed in the United States since 1990,155 and 
key committee chairmen and congressional leaders are hostile to new 
environmental legislation. Major new legislation involving recycling man-
dates, new fees on producers, and a nationwide take-back obligation for 
products is highly unlikely in the current Administration and Congress, and 
there is no existing federal statutory authority in the United States for EPA 
to implement a product take-back requirement on its own. 
In contrast, the European Parliament, which has had a strong influ-
ence on the EU's waste directives, is one of the most left-leaning and envi-
ronmentally conscious legislative bodies in the world, with strong Green 
Party representation. 156 The Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the Parlia-
ment's decision-making powers with respect to environmental policy, and 
most environmental legislation now goes through a co-decision procedure 
between the Parliament and the Council. 157 These new procedures "have 
therefore created an avenue whereby the European Parliament can extend 
153 Verweij, supra note 151, at 1033 (using the Clean Water Act as an example of a 
Democratic Congress enacting legislation with unrealistic timetables, against the opposi-
tion of President Nixon). 
154 See Breyer & Heyvaert, supra note 142, at 309-10, 338-39 (comparing the adver-
sarial approach to risk regulation in the United States with the more corporatist and tech-
nocratic approach in the EU). 
155 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7505-7671 (2000)), are widely considered to be the last ma-
jor piece of U.S. environmental legislation. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: 
How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and the Agencies in 
Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. I, 5 n.I8 (2005). However, there have been 
some subsequent, but less significant legislative changes, such as the Food Quality Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, I 10 Stat. 1513 (1996), the Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-
ments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-82, I 10 Stat. 1613 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-
300j (2000)), and the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(2000)). 
156 The Green Party won 5.46% of the seats in the 2004 elections. European Parliament 
Elections Website, Members of the EP, at http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-electionlsites/enl 
resultsl306/parties_perc.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). 
157 BAILEY, supra note 82, at 21. 
88 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 30 
its influence on environmental decisions beyond those customary for a 
national parliament." 158 Unlike in the United States, where the federal gov-
ernment cannot directly require states to adopt or implement environmental 
policy, the European Union has implemented environmental policy 
through a top-down structure in which EU Directives establish broad pol-
icy that Member States are required to carry out. As a result, concludes 
one leading scholar of EU environmental law, "the EU is now the driving 
force behind environmental policy across the majority of the continent." 159 
The lack of adoption of EPR in the United States likely reflects the 
United States' historic neglect of product externalities in general. In the 
1970s, when the major environmental statutes were enacted, Congress and 
the public focused on regulating emissions from major industrial sources, 
which were (and still are) the largest and most visible contributors to air 
and water pollution. 160 Emissions contributions from individual activities, 
or from specific products (other than automobiles), were simply too low in 
priority to receive regulatory attention. 161 Exclusions for small polluters 
inserted into most environmental laws reflected the practical difficulties 
of imposing onerous administrative, record-keeping, and disposal require-
ments on individuals and small businesses. Notably, this focus on major 
industrial sources likely contributed to a widespread belief that the actions 
of individuals were not a significant cause of environmental harm. 162 
U.S. environmental law has rarely regulated how products should be 
made, or the materials that should be used. In the thirty-five years of modern 
environmental law in the United States, there have been very few regula-
tions aimed directly at product design or product externalities, other than 
those governing automobile fuel efficiency and emissions (which manu-
facturers fought bitterly), and laws in several states mandating recycled 
content in plastic packaging and newsprint. 163 In contrast, EU risk regula-
tion has historically focused to a far greater extent on standard-setting for 
products themselves because of the origins of the European Union as a pro-
moter of trade harmonization for goods and services. 164 The European 
Union has relied to a far greater degree than the United States on so-called 
"positive integration," which involves adoption of harmonized product 
standards to smooth the functioning of the Common Market. 165 EU envi-
ronmental policy now seems directly aimed at shaping the design of prod-
158 /d. at 22. 
159 /d. at 17. 
160 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and 
Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191,206-08 (2001). 
161 See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 2, at 527-28. 
162 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Ac-
tivation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1101, 1130-32 (2005). 
163 For a discussion of auto emissions standards and standards for plastic packaging and 
newsprint, see Salzman, Sustainable Consumption, supra note 8, at 1261-62. 
164 See Breyer & Heyvaert, supra note 142, at 316. 
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ucts, at least at the margins, to "green" the flow of materials through the 
European economy. 
The lack of political pressure in the United States regarding new waste 
management practices also reflects the relative abundance of landfill space 
in the United States. While the number of landfills in the United States de-
clined by 78% between 1986 and 2001, from 7683 to 1858, disposal capac-
ity remained constant because modern landfills are larger. 166 The National 
Solid Waste Association estimates that, using only existing landfills, the 
United States has twenty more years of landfill capacity. 167 There is enor-
mous regional variation in capacity. Texas, for instance, is estimated to 
have forty-six years of capacity, while California has about thirteen years 
remaining and New York has less than ten. 168 In a recent survey, forty-one 
states indicated that landfill capacity would be added in the next few 
years. 169 
Given these regional differences, there are heated arguments over 
whether there is a solid waste "crisis" in the United States, 170 and one's posi-
tion on this baseline issue is likely to be strongly correlated with one's posi-
tion on EPR or other recycling initiatives. That producers and consumers 
both face a zero price for waste disposal has undoubtedly contributed to a 
throwaway mentality in production and consumption decisions, to greatly 
excessive packaging, and to an inattention to the environmental impacts of 
product design. Despite these concerns, there is very little sense of crisis 
among the American public, and very little public pressure in the United 
States to take a more comprehensive approach to waste and consumption 
decisions. 
The differences between the world's two largest economic powers on 
environmental policy are reflected in their particular approaches to EPR. 
There are fundamental disagreements between the United States and the 
European Union on the utility of EPR and, in particular, whether produc-
ers should have any particular responsibility for environmental external-
ities from their products. The question of "who is the polluter?," discussed 
supra in Part II, was debated at length in the first federal discussions on 
EPR, which occurred in the mid-1990s under the auspices of the Clinton 
Administration's President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD). 
U.S. industry groups strongly resisted the label of "polluter" with respect 
to discarded products, and to preserve consensus, the PCSD adopted the 
term "Extended Product Responsibility" to reflect a shared responsibility 
166 American Society of Civil Engineers, Report Card for America's Infrastructure: 
Solid Waste [C+ ], http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id=33 (last visited Oct. 
1, 2005) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
167 /d. 
168 See The State of Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE MAG., Jan. 2004, at 40. New York 
data estimated from landfill capacity in Table 7 (90,000,000 tons), and annual MSW land-
filling in Table 4 (13,143,000 tons). /d. 
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170 See, e.g., John Tierney, Recycling is Garbage, N.Y. TiMES MAG., June 30, 1996, at 24. 
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model in which mitigating the environmental impacts of products should 
be shared up and down the product chain (i.e., among manufacturers, dis-
tributors, retailers, consumers, and municipalities). 171 
Today, the rhetoric of Extended Product Responsibility continues to 
dominate discussions about product externalities in the United States, disfa-
voring waste policy solutions that impose particular take-back or other re-
sponsibilities on producers. Extended Product Responsibility is closely 
related to the concept of Product Stewardship, which is growing in impor-
tance as a waste management strategy in the United States. Product Stew-
ardship programs usually involve voluntary approaches and multi-stake-
holder dialogues between state governments, industry, and consumer and 
environmental groups to arrive at better management practices for particular 
products. Some states have implemented Product Stewardship initiatives 
for electronics waste, in which state environmental officials work with in-
dustries on voluntary measures to green the supply chain, educate consumers 
about disposal, and, in some cases, return discarded products to manufactur-
ers.172 According to one study, more than fifty-two pieces of legislation con-
cerning electronics waste have been introduced in twenty-six state legis-
latures. 173 
Voluntary approaches to managing particular classes of hazardous 
products need to be encouraged. They allow for experimentation and close 
public-private cooperation on waste issues, and some progressive manu-
facturers are beginning to take proactive measures to manage their own 
products. Sony has a well-functioning program in Minnesota to take back 
Sony products, for example, and Apple recently announced it will take 
back its iPods for recycling. Major computer manufacturers such as Dell, 
IBM, and Sony, and retailers such as Best Buy, have also established vol-
untary programs to take back electronic waste, and in some cases they will 
take back products made by other manufacturers, or sold by other retail-
ers.I74 
171 Young, supra note II, at 74-75; Gary A. Davis et al., Extended Product Responsi-
bility: A Tool for a Sustainable Economy, ENV'T, Sept. 1997, at 12. 
172 See, e.g., Amy Porter, Minnesota is First State to Propose Extended Producer Re-
sponsibility Program, BNA DAILY ENv'T REP., May 17, 1999 (describing Minnesota's volun-
tary product stewardship initiatives for carpets, paints, and CRTs). 
173 Joe Truini, Stewardship Could Fall on States' Shoulders, PLASTICS NEws, at 71, 
June 23, 2003. See also Fishbein, EPR: What Does It Mean?, supra note 65, at 54. In March 
2005, the Northeast Recycling Council and the Council of State Governments' Eastern 
Regional Conference began a joint effort to develop draft legislation for management of 
used electronics in the Northeast. See Linda Roeder, 10 Northeastern States Join in Seek-
ing Unified Approach to Used Electronics, 36 BNA ENV'T REP. 540 (2005). 
174 See, e.g., Mail-Back Not Seen As Final Solution for Computer Waste in the US, Bus. 
& ENv'T, July I, 2001, at II. Dell will recycle computers of any brand upon purchase of a 
Dell computer, and, even without a purchase, will recycle computers for an airbill fee of 
$10.00. See Dell, Dell Recycling (2005), http://wwwl.us.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic. 
aspx/dell_recycling (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law 
Review). Best Buy offers drop-boxes for cell phones and batteries in its stores and offers 
regional recycling events for a wide range of consumer electronics. See also Best Buy, Best 
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However, the voluntary model of product stewardship, standing alone, 
is probably not sufficient to make a significant difference in the U.S. waste 
stream, particularly for product classes with dozens of manufacturers. One 
of the earliest voluntary product stewardship programs was the recharge-
able battery take-back program organized by the Rechargeable Battery 
Recycling Corporation ("RBRC"), a nonprofit created by battery manufac-
turers after passage of the Mercury Containing and Rechargeable Battery 
Management Act of 1996,175 which lowered regulatory barriers to battery 
recycling. RBRC has established municipal and retailer collection points 
for rechargeable batteries and charges manufacturers a license fee for putting 
batteries on the market, the proceeds from which are used to fund collection 
and recycling (the fee is not scaled to provide incentives for better design). 
An independent study of RBRC activities conducted in 2005 concluded 
that the RBRC was falling far short of its recycling goals, and researchers 
had difficulty finding battery drop-off bins in retail stores that the RBRC 
website indicated as drop-off locations. 176 Due to lack of consumer knowl-
edge and the ease of discarding electronics in the trash, voluntary initia-
tives by manufacturers and retailers have made only a small contribution to 
diverting e-waste from the municipal waste stream. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The EU experience with EPR highlights that a novel theory of envi-
ronmental regulation, based on internalizing product externalities and incen-
tivizing design changes through price signals from waste management, is 
difficult and costly to implement effectively. This Article therefore rec-
ommends that the United States examine alternative policy instruments to 
develop a more comprehensive product policy for the product classes that 
pose the most environmental hazards. 
A U.S. product policy should include some components of Europe's 
Integrated Product Policy, such as increased use of ecolabeling and govern-
ment procurement standards that could help steer manufacturers toward 
producing greener products with minimal regulatory intervention. On the 
recycling front, the United States should identify the product classes that 
Buy Community Relations-Recycling Events, http://communications.bestbuy.com/ 
communityrelations/Recycling.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) (on file with the Harvard 
Environmental Law Review). IBM will take back any manufacturer's computer and 
peripherals for a fee of $29.99. See IBM, Environment-Product Recycling Programs, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/environment/products/pcrservice. shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) 
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
175 Pub. L. No. 104-142, 110 Stat. 1276 (1996). (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14301-14336 
(2000)). 
176 See INFORM Inc., Inform Reports, Spring/Summer 2005, at 3, 9, available at http:// 
www.informinc.org/INFORMReportsSMSP2005.pdf (noting that RBRC was about 70% short 
of meeting the recycling goals in 2003 and 2004 that it had set in 1998). Less than half the 
stores listed on RBRC website as collection points actually had battery drop-off boxes. /d. 
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pose the greatest environmental impacts from production or disposal and 
then determine which party is in the best position, taking into account trans-
action costs, to fund an improved recycling infrastructure: consumers, tax-
payers/municipalities, or, perhaps, producers funding recycling efforts on 
a collective basis. For electronics, available evidence from the European 
Union suggests that producer responsibility is an inefficient way to fund the 
system. 
Electronics are at the top of the list of product classes that the United 
States needs to address. 177 This toxic waste stream is growing rapidly and 
is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. Many consumer electronics 
fail the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure ("TCLP"), a test for haz-
ardous characteristics used in the United States and many other devel-
oped countries to simulate the acidic conditions of landfills. 178 In other 
words, if not for RCRA's exclusions for household wastes, described in 
Part II, much of the consumer electronics waste stream would be stringently 
regulated as hazardous waste in the United States and would be required to 
be disposed in licensed hazardous waste facilities. 
Ironically, EPA promulgated the household hazardous waste exclusion 
in 1980,179 just as the consumer electronics revolution was in its infancy. 
While it is still infeasible to subject every household in the United States to 
RCRA's stringent requirements for hazardous waste disposal, new kinds of 
policies are needed in the United States to reduce the trashcan disposal of 
electronics and ensure that a higher proportion of these products are re-
cycled within the United States. The United States recycles only about 
10% of its electronics waste stream. 180 A substantial portion of the U.S. 
electronics waste stream diverted to recycling is sent to Asia, 181 where it 
177 Looking at the European experience, packaging appears to be a feasible item to 
which to apply EPR principles and spur changes in design, but there is little pressure to 
implement producer responsibility for packaging, with attendant transportation and logisti-
cal costs, in the United States. Indeed, given the low population density in many parts of 
the United States, the environmental impacts from transporting packaging long distances to 
recycling centers may outweigh recycling's environmental benefits. Reynolds, supra note 
128, at 67-68. On the supply side, the United States also has abundant supplies of natural 
resources, with relatively cheap access to paper, metals, and plastics, which could make it 
difficult for recycled materials to compete in the marketplace with virgin resources. /d. 
178 See 40 CFR § 261.24 (2004). TCLP results for computer monitors average about 
18.5 mg/1 for lead, or nearly four times the U.S. regulatory standard. See EXPORTING HARM, 
supra note 35, at 27. Circuit boards leach lead at an even higher rate. According to an Aus-
tralian study, TCLP results for circuit boards range from 142 mg/L to 1325 mg!L for lead. 
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AND ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES OR SCRAP UNDER THE HAZARDOUS WASTE ACT 13 (1999), 
available at http://www.com-it.net.au/scrap.pdf. 
179 See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,099 (May 19, 1980). 
180 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 43, at viii. 
181 The Basel Action Network has estimates that eighty percent of U.S. electronics waste 
sent for recycling is actually shipped to Asia. EXPORTING HARM, supra note 35, at 11-12. 
In February 2003, fifteen recycling firms in the United States signed a "Pledge of True 
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is dismantled under abysmal environmental conditions, such as open burn-
ing of electronics, backyard acid-baths to extract metals from circuit boards, 
and dismantling electronic equipment without proper ventilation. 182 As the 
United States develops a more comprehensive management plan for elec-
tronics waste, it should be based on the principle that the waste stream 
should be managed within our own borders. 
A product policy targeting electronics need not be as sweeping as in 
the European Union, where the WEEE Directive encompasses many prod-
ucts that may have minimal environmental impacts, such as toys, hair dryers, 
power tools, and even electric fry pans. 183 The United States should focus on 
the largest contributors to the waste disposal problem, such as televisions, 
information technology equipment, audio equipment, and cell phones. 
A key component of a U.S. product policy targeting electronics should 
be content standards similar to the EU's RoHS Directive. The RoHS Di-
rective is already spurring large U.S. electronics manufacturers (and for-
eign manufacturers that sell in the United States and in the European Un-
ion) to change their production practices and find substitutes for the banned 
hazardous substances. Therefore, U.S. manufacturers may be receptive to 
similar content standards enacted in the United States, which would re-
duce the hazardous content of electronics and associated impacts from land-
filling and incineration, even if electronics were not recycled. 
Notably, California's Electronic Waste Recycling Act of 2003 already 
mandates that certain electronic products sold in California, with video 
displays larger than four inches, must be RoBS-compliant. 184 This state pro-
vision is likely to affect manufacturing nationwide for these products, 
given the size of the California market, and may elevate RoHS into a kind of 
global electronics standard. Not only does the California legislation ex-
Finally, A Responsible Way to Get Rid of that Old Computer!: Electronics Recyclers Pledge: 
No Export, No Dumping, No Prisons (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.crra.com/ 
ewaste/articles/finally.html. 
182 The environmental impacts of exported e-waste were amply documented in ExPORTING 
HARM, supra note 35. That report documents an undercover investigation in Guiyu, a town 
largely dedicated to e-waste dismantlement, in the Guangzhou region of southeast China. 
Common "recycling" practices in Guiyu included open burning, unregulated acid baths to 
remove precious metals from chips, manual dismantlement of toner cartridges with no 
respiratory protection, de-soldering circuit boards over open fires to extract lead, and 
dumping of unusable components and by-products along the banks of the Lianjiang River. 
Lab testing on one water sample from Guiyu found lead levels 190 times higher than WHO 
drinking water guidelines. Barium, tin, and chromium were found in sediments at 10, 152, 
and 1338 times EPA reporting thresholds, respectively. See ExPORTING HARM, supra note 
35, at 17-22. 
183 See WEEE Directive, supra note 7, Annex lB. 
184 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE,§ 25214.10(b) (2004) ("The department shall 
adopt regulations ... that prohibit an electronic device from being sold or offered for sale 
in this state if the electronic device is prohibited from being sold or offered for sale in the 
European Union on and after its date of manufacture, to the extent that Directive 2002/95/EC, 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on January 
27, 2003, and as amended thereafter by the Commission of European Communities, pro-
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pressly reference RoHS, but it also provides that the list of prohibited 
substances in California will expand as the European Union amends RoHS 
to ban new substances. 185 It also precludes the California Department of 
Toxic Substances Control from issuing substance bans for electronics that 
are "in addition to, or more stringent than" RoHS. 186 That a U.S. state has 
adopted the product design standards of a foreign jurisdiction is a new 
frontier in environmental regulation and reflects the global reach of the EU's 
move toward product-oriented environmental regimes. Enacting a RoHS-
like content standard at the federal level is a sensible adjunct to the changes 
that are already taking place in the U.S. marketplace. 
Because some toxic substances in electronics cannot be phased out 
(such as lead in CRTs or mercury in fluorescent bulbs), a more compre-
hensive U.S. policy for electronics should also include mechanisms for in-
creased recycling. Prospects for increased recycling have improved since 
major electronics industry players committed, preliminarily, to the con-
cept of a national management system for discarded electronics in the 
United States. The commitment came during talks under the National Elec-
tronics Product Stewardship Initiative ("NEPSI"), an EPA-sponsored dia-
logue among electronics manufacturers, environmentalists, retailers, and 
state and local regulators. 187 The goal of NEPSI was to achieve consensus 
among stakeholders on a management plan and then present model legisla-
tion to Congress. In a February 2004 consensus statement, the NEPSI par-
ticipants recommended the creation of a national electronics management 
system to "ensure a level playing field and the environmentally sound man-
agement of used electronics." 188 The NEPSI talks quickly fell apart, how-
ever, due to disagreements over how the new system would be financed. 189 
A new recycling program for electronics in the United States should 
have two main goals: first, it should raise substantial new funds to create 
an improved collection and recycling infrastructure, and second, it should 
encourage manufacturers that choose to take back their own products on 
an individual basis to do so. If companies can design their products to con-
tain fewer hazardous substances or to be more recyclable or more easily 
dismantled, they should be able to reap the financial benefits from doing 
so within a closed-loop take-back system for their own products. Under such 
185Jd. 
186 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE,§ 25214.10(f)(l) (2004). 
187 NEPSI was organized in early 2001 with the goal of "develop[ing] a system, which 
includes a viable financing mechanism, to maximize the collection, reuse, and recycling of 
used electronics, while considering appropriate incentives to design products that facilitate 
source reduction, reuse and recycling; reduce toxicity; and increase recycled content." See 
Press Release, NEPSI, National Dialogue Begins to Develop National Reuse and Recycling 
Solutions for Used Electronic Products (June 29, 2001), available at http://eerc.ra.utk.edu/ 
clean/nepsi/pdfs/PressRelease-6-29. pdf. 
188 NEPSI Compromise Resolution (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://eerc.ra.utk.edu/ 
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189 See NEPSI Meets in Seattle for Crucial Session, WARREN's CONSUMER ELECTRON-
ICS DAILY, June 12, 2003. 
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a system, individual responsibility would be "nested" within a larger re-
cycling system and would remain a viable option for companies that believe 
there are cost savings from handling their own products. 
A consumer-financed Advance Recovery Fee is a viable alternative to 
producer-financed systems that could achieve these dual goals. Retailers 
would forward the proceeds to a governmental authority that would fund 
municipal collection centers and subsidize private recycling operations to 
make recycling economical. 190 Tax incidence theory holds that some of the 
ARF would actually be absorbed by manufacturers or retailers, so the burden 
of funding the new recycling infrastructure would be shared. 191 
In 2003, California implemented an ARF for certain electronic de-
vices containing video displays larger than four inches, 192 and the Nether-
lands and Switzerland have used an ARF for a wide variety of consumer 
electronics and appliances. 193 The amount of the ARFs could be set based 
on the size, weight, or type of product. 194 If feasible, government officials 
could also correlate the fees with the constituents and environmental charac-
teristics of products, but such correlation is not essential to the success of 
the program, as promoting design change is not the purpose of the fee. 
Rather, the purpose is to provide a dedicated source of funds for a substan-
tially improved recycling infrastructure. 
From the perspective of state and local governments, ARFs are attrac-
tive because they put a steady source of cash into government accounts to 
fund the recycling infrastructure that will be needed to manage waste (even 
"historic waste" already on the market when the ARF is enacted). 195 Re-
call that separate collection of waste is one of the major expenses of re-
cycling programs, including those under EPR, and municipalities want to 
ensure that new requirements for recycling electronics do not become an 
unfunded mandate. Many manufacturers favor an ARF as well, because it 
leaves producers out of the collection and recycling process and may lead 
to a steady supply of subsidized secondary materials. However, in the NEPSI 
discussions, some manufacturers, such as Dell and Hewlett-Packard, op-
190 Subsidizing recycling would help reduce the flow of e-waste to Asia. According to a 
study prepared for EPA, the cost of recycling a computer is approximately $0.38 per pound 
in the United States, but only $0.15 to $0.30 per pound in Asia, including all transportation 
costs. See Global Futures Foundation, supra note 22. 
191 See, e.g., Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continu-
ous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Applications, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 189, 241 (2002) 
("Just because consumers nominally pay a sales tax at the time of purchase does not mean 
that they bear the entire burden of the tax, or indeed any of it."). 
192 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42463(£)(1) (2005). 
193 Tow, supra note 110, at 25, 32, 35-36. In both countries, the ARFs are flat fees that 
are not scaled to approximate environmental impacts. /d. 
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PuB. REs. CoDE § 42464(a) (2005). Retailers are permitted to keep three percent of the fees 
they collect to cover their administrative costs. CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE § 42464(c) (2005). 
195 See Much at Stake at Final NEPSI E-Waste Meeting, WARREN's CONSUMER ELEC-
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posed an ARF, favoring an individual responsibility model for product 
take-back that would allow them to reap the benefits of their efforts to 
"green" their products and make them more recyclable. 196 
To satisfy these competing interests-raising revenue with minimal 
administrative costs while still providing options for companies that want 
to take back their own products-products whose manufacturers establish 
their own closed-loop product return systems could be exempted from the 
ARF. This kind of ARF "opt-out" would make products from manufac-
turers that establish their own take back systems cheaper in the market-
place. In other words, the ARF would be a kind of "play-or-pay" dedicated 
sales tax, in which companies could decide to establish their own product 
return-and-recycling systems or have their customers pay an extra fee to the 
state at the point of purchase to fund recycling. 197 
An ARF has an additional benefit, not present in a producer funded 
take-back system: it would help consumers understand that there is a real 
environmental and disposal cost for products that they purchase that contain 
hazardous substances. It also would help consumers understand that pol-
lution is not caused only by industrial firms, but also by individual consump-
tion decisions. 
U.S. environmental groups that have been active on the electronics 
waste issue generally oppose an ARF and advocate EPR policies that di-
rectly assign take-back responsibility to producers, 198 on the grounds that 
only EPR provides incentives for ecological design of products. As the 
Clean Computer Campaign, a coalition of U.S. environmental groups, has 
asserted, "[a] system that merely collects money at point of sale and hands it 
over to a government agency to 'solve the problem' does little to encour-
age clean production-since there are no built-in incentives in the approach 
to encourage better design .... " 199 
196 See Govt. Groups to Push for Interim Financing System at NEPSI, WARREN's CoN-
SUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, Sept. 19, 2003. Cell phones are another example of a product 
for which it might be attractive to establish a closed-loop return system. Cell phones are 
usually sold at retail locations that also sell phone service, and the ongoing contract be-
tween the consumer and the phone service provider (which itself has contracts to buy mil-
lions of phones from manufacturers) would likely help cell phone manufacturers to imple-
ment take-back programs for their products on an individual responsibility basis. See Linda 
Roeder, Cell Phone Businesses Leading Efforts to Recycle Electronics Products, EPA Says, 
36 BNA ENV'T REP. 420 (2005). 
197 Proceeds from an ARF would be used to fund collection of historic waste and or-
phan waste, in addition to "new" waste. An electronics recycling policy would have to ensure 
that companies that opt out by taking back their own products still make some financial 
contribution, at least in the initial years of the program, toward management of historic and 
orphan waste. 
198 See Computer TakeBack Campaign, Advance Recovery Fees (ARFs) and the Need for 
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This view ignores the practical problems of implementing EPR on 
an individual-responsibility basis nationwide in the United States and the 
apparent preference in the European Union for collective EPR systems, 
which dilute or eliminate design incentives. Given the logistical hurdles 
of implementing mandatory product take-back on an individual responsi-
bility basis, the real choice is between ARFs and recycling systems financed 
by producers on a collective basis-for example, on the basis of market-
share, or flat fees paid by producers for putting certain products on the 
market-which provide few design incentives. An ARF with an opt-out for 
producers that establish their own take-back mechanisms at least pro-
vides some incentive for voluntary design changes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Extended Producer Responsibility, as outlined in the theoretical lit-
erature, appears to be a potentially revolutionary environmental policy that 
goes beyond facility-based regulation to shape the environmental impacts 
of products themselves. However, this Article, which critiques EPR in theory 
and practice, demonstrates that EPR may not be living up to expectations, 
and, indeed, does not appear to be providing dramatic incentives for a 
new era of ecologically friendly product design. While there is widespread 
agreement on the need to internalize externalities and "get the prices right" 
to achieve more sustainable production and consumption, it is often difficult 
to quantify the externalities from particular products, let alone force those 
costs back on producers with reasonable transaction costs. As a conse-
quence, most of the existing EPR programs in the European Union have 
implemented collective-responsibility systems, which substantially dilute 
the necessary price signals and incentives for reducing the environmental 
impacts of products. The transaction costs of individual responsibility sys-
tems that could force true cost internalization-including, at the front end, 
assessment of fees correlated to product constituents and recyclability and, at 
the back end, separate collection from consumers of specific products or 
specific brands-appear to be substantial. Policymakers need to consider 
carefully such transaction costs in evaluating which parties are best posi-
tioned to absorb long-term responsibility for the environmental impacts 
of products. 
Proponents of EPR may be relying on one policy to accomplish too 
many goals, including raising revenue for recycling, shifting the waste bur-
den from municipalities, reducing use of virgin materials, and providing 
a financial incentive to improve the environmental characteristics of prod-
ucts. An economics maxim holds that at least as many policy instruments 
are needed as policy objectives,200 and a mix of policy instruments will 
200 Margaret Walls & Karen Palmer, Upstream Pollution, Downstream Waste Disposal, 
and the Design of Comprehensive Environmental Policies, 41 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 
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likely be necessary to mitigate the environmental externalities from prod-
ucts. The EU's Integrated Product Policy reflects this multi-pronged ap-
proach. The United States does need a more comprehensive approach to 
product externalities, which are neglected under environmental regimes that 
focus only on manufacturing facilities, but the lessons from implement-
ing EPR should prompt thorough consideration of alternative approaches. 
94, 96 (2001). See also Margaret Walls, EPR Policy Goals and Policy Choices: What Does 
Economics Tell Us?, in OECD, EcoNOMIC AsPECTS OF EPR, supra note 96, at 21 (noting 
that the goals of EPR need to be clarified and that it is an open question of whether EPR is 
"intended to deal with waste volumes, the toxic constituents of waste, the method of waste 
disposal, or a combination of these things"). 
